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1 Cornelius Lanczos, a mathematician working in the field of applied analysis, expressed the history of mathematics in three phases:

1) A given physical situation is translated into the realm of numbers,
2) By purely formal operations with these numbers certain mathematical results are obtained, [and]
3) These results are translated back into the world of physical reality (1988, p. 1).¹

Formal papers, in subjects related to aviation, roughly follow the same course. However, there appears to be a weakness in aviation research, that being the omission of the third phase.

It is not good enough that conclusions are drawn, if those conclusions fail to improve the system observed. Clearly, the observed have a say in implementing the conclusions of research, but their failure to implement the conclusions drawn by the researcher may be more indicative of a lack of understanding than a lack of desire. Researchers tend to peer into complex systems as through a soda straw, forming formal opinions on the finite without understanding the complete system. Industry, ever mindful of the complete system, may find research irrelevant, because it makes much to do about nothing.

The editorial staff, to include those listed as consulting editors, is committed to the improvement of all individuals within the aviation community. We seek to enhance existing systems bearing in mind that small improvements must not upset the delicate balance between too little and too much help. We also seek to promote safety, not by lip service, but by demonstration in how we execute our studies and how we report our findings.

We feel that the best way to translate results back to the physical world is to incorporate the viewpoints of people around the globe. Without the influence of a worldwide community, we deny the significance of diversity, and ignore the perspectives of gifted scientists from different countries. It is our hope that each reader will feel the same.

EDITOR’S NOTES

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Papers

In our lead article, Role Playing in Flight Instructor Training: How effective is it?, Crow, Niemczyk, and Andrews investigate the “role-playing” method of training. This research suggests that the method in which flight instructors are trained produces behaviors that do not translate to real-world instruction, therefore potentially hindering the development of effective flight instructors.

Bowen, Sabin, and Patankar assess indicators of behavior prior to and following an MRM training program in Aviation Maintenance Human Factors in a Systems Context: Implications for Training. Structural equation modeling procedures found evidence to support using a systems framework to develop and assess safety training in industry.

In Safety Culture: The Perception of Taiwan’s Aviation Leaders, Lu, Young, and Schreckengast’s study aims to discover the status of safety culture after the initiation of SMS in Taiwan. A list of recommendations is provided for the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Republic of China (CAAROC) to promote airport safety. This methodology would be applicable to other aviation organizations as an initial indicator of their baseline safety culture.

Models created for the FAA to estimate total annual operations by general aviation (GA) airports have been recreated and examined by Black and Chimka in Re-estimating and Remodeling General Aviation Operations. Models were originally estimated to predict the future size of airports, but research would go toward detection of unusual GA activity that might be due to a homeland security threat.

In Fanjoy and Gao’s study, Learning Styles of Chinese Aviation Students, researchers administered the Kolb Learning Style Inventory (LSI) and a short biographical survey to 293 students. An analysis of the data suggest that over a four-year college curriculum learning style shifts from predominately assimilator and converger learning styles towards diverger and assimilator learning styles, These insights may be useful in the development of curricula for western flight training institutions tasked with the preparation of students from dissimilar cultures.

In An Analysis of Statistical Power in Aviation Research, Ison sought to evaluate the statistical power of aviation research published in peer-reviewed journals. Guidance on ways researchers can improve power and/or reduce sample size requirements are provided. Suggestions for future research and policies are also provided.

Young and Molesworth's study, The Effects of Caffeine on Learning: A Pilot’s Perspective, investigates whether caffeine can facilitate the rate at which individuals acquire and apply skills. These findings are discussed from a theoretical and operational perspective.

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Volume 11, Number 1 2011

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Role Playing in Flight Instructor Training: How effective is it?

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Abstract

Flight instructor training has remained largely unchanged since the beginning of aviation. The current method of training mostly involves the flight instructor trainee “role-playing” as the instructor to their instructor who is “role-playing” as the student. An analysis of the behaviors of flight instructor instrument trainees exhibited while teaching their peers (other classmates) indicates that the behaviors are different than those used when teaching an actual instrument student. This research suggests that the method in which flight instructors are trained produces behaviors that do not translate to real-world instruction, therefore potentially hindering the development of effective flight instructors.

Role Playing in Flight Instructor Training: How effective is it?

Flight Instructors are as vital to aviation as teachers are to our educational system, providing training to the next generation of pilots. Rod Machado is a flight instructor with over 8,000 hours of aviation instruction experience. He is the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) national flight instructor spokesman, as well as a National Accident Prevention counselor appointed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in Washington D.C. In a 2005 interview he was asked, “What is the most important thing for a student pilot to consider when they seek a flight instructor?” His answer was that the student must find a “good one” (Machado, 2005). Furthermore, Machado stated that finding the right instructor is so important that it is better to “spend three years looking for a good one, rather than spend three minutes with a bad one” (Machado, 2005). His statements seem to indicate that there are substantial differences among the many certificated flight instructors in the flight training industry.

Flight instructor training has remained largely unchanged since the beginning of aviation and is much more of an art form than a science (Wilt, Cain, & Antalfy, 2001). In a study focusing on flight instruction in Canada and Australia, Henley found that “despite the flight instructor’s key role in flight training, very little research has assessed the quality of civil flight instructor training and estab-
lished ways of maximizing the instructor’s effectiveness in flight training” (Henley, 1991, p. 320). Although this research is centered in Australia and Canada, there is evidence of the same problems occurring in the United States (Wright, 2003; Wilt, et al., 2001). According to the FAA, there is an issue with whether the existing guidelines, standards, and curriculum are being used effectively or at all by the training community (Wright, 2003). This confirms the need to investigate the methods with which flight instructors are trained in the United States. Many issues have surfaced through scattered research projects regarding flight instructor training such as teaching-to-the-test, poor instructors, inadequate examinations, and role playing (Henley, 1995; Wright, 2003).

While role-playing has been shown to be an effective and engaging tool in group instruction, there is very little evidence to support its use in the cockpit. Flight instructor trainees will typically role-play as an instructor, and their instructor will role-play as a student. This is done because the nature of the practical exam is nearly a role-play for the Designated Pilot Examiner (Henley, 1995). The practical exam for flight instructors consists of demonstrating to the Designated Pilot Examiner that the pilot applicant can teach while flying. The pilot applicant must teach certain tasks to the examiner who role-plays as the student. Results of a survey by Henley (1995) suggest that this method of training may not be as effective as previously thought, therefore, a further look at the use of role-playing in flight instructor training is necessary. An analysis of the behaviors of instructor trainees while role-playing as an instructor, toward either an actual student or a person who is role-playing as a student, may shed light on this issue.

Scope

This investigation was an observational study in which the behaviors of flight instructor instrument trainees were analyzed to determine if there was a significant difference on trainee behaviors depending on whether or not the student was a classmate (a peer instrument instructor trainee) or an actual instrument flight student who was unfamiliar with the material.

Assumptions

This research assumed that the instructor trainees all had the same level of training, and assumed the same with the actual instrument students. It also assumed that the behaviors of the student instructors while instructing in a flight simulator could be generalized to flight training in an aircraft.

Literature Review

There is very little research available on flight instructor training. Researchers have been examining many specific topics to improve flight training for students such as stress (Henley, 1991), learning theories (Bye & Henley, 2003; Henley & Bye, 2003; Hunt, 2003; Karp, Turney, & McCurry, 1999; Moore, Lehrer, & Telfer, 1997; Moore, Lehrer, & Telfer, 2001; Wilt, et al., 2001), evaluation (Henley, 1995; Wright, 2003), and methods of debriefing (Blickensderfer, Schumacher, & Summers, 2007) but very little has been done in improving flight instructor training. This literature review provides information on the competencies flight instructors must demonstrate in order to be certified in the United States followed by a review of current research relating to flight instructor training.

Flight Instructor Competence

Although the aviation industry has changed significantly in the past 60 years, the framework for licensing pilots has changed very little since the 1940’s (Hunt, 2001). Currently, flight instructor competence is measured by the FAA which regulates the aviation industry in the United States. The Federal Aviation Regulations 14 CFR Part 61.181 outlines eligibility, aeronautical knowledge, and flight proficiency requirements for flight instructor applicants (FAA, 2011). It is important to note that flight instructor applicants must pass two written exams, one on the fundamentals of instructing and the other on general flight knowledge, as well as
The written tests are multiple-choice and are available commercially to the public, which allows most applicants to memorize the correct answers (Casner, Jones & Irani, 2004). Nevertheless, flight instructor applicants are quizzed by a Designated Pilot Examiner during the oral exam portion of their practical test. The practical exam is similar to a driver's test at the Department of Motor Vehicles, where an examiner rides along to determine if an individual is competent to receive his or her driver's license. Similarly, in the practical exam, the Designated Pilot Examiner has the responsibility for determining that the applicant meets the acceptable standards of teaching ability, knowledge, and skill required in each of the tasks found in the *Practical Test Standards* (PTS) (FAA, 2006). The PTS outlines specific tasks and completion standards the applicant must perform in order to pass the practical test. Most of the tasks in the flight instructor PTS require that the applicant demonstrate instructional knowledge by being able to use the appropriate reference to provide the correlative level of knowledge of a subject, procedure, or maneuver (FAA, 2006).

In the *Fundamentals of Instruction* handbook published by the FAA, there are four levels of learning: rote, understanding, application, and correlation (FAA, 2008). Rote knowledge is simply being able to remember key items; whereas in the understanding level of learning, the student is able to comprehend the meaning of what they are remembering or doing. When the student reaches the application level of learning he or she is able to apply knowledge that has been learned. Finally, when the student is able to associate what has been learned, understood, and applied with previous or subsequent learning, he or she has reached the correlative level of knowledge.

The applicant must also follow the recommended teaching procedures and techniques explained in the *Aviation Instructors Handbook* (FAA, 2008). This handbook briefly outlines psychological material relating to learning and teaching. Most instructor applicants come prepared to the practical test with a lesson plan outlining the objectives, elements, and completion standards for the lesson they will teach their Designated Pilot Examiner. The applicant must satisfactorily pass the practical test on the areas of operation listed in 61.187(b) of the Federal Aviation Regulations and must demonstrate instructional knowledge in the elements and common errors of a maneuver or procedure (FAA, 2006).

**Current Training Issues**

One of the reasons the examining method described above may have hindered the training of the flight instructor population could be because flight instructors have been teaching to the test (Wright, 2003). Instructors typically know what examiners are looking for and often teach their students to simply pass the practical test, denying them the skills, knowledge, and attitudes necessary for daily flight (Hunt, 1997; Lintern, 1995; Moore, Lehrer, & Telfer, 1997). A look at Henley’s research in Australia and Canada shows how instructors’ behaviors impaired their students’ ability to learn because they did not understand the factors that affect learning (Henley & Bye, 2003). Perhaps instructors should be teaching their instructor applicants how to apply the fundamentals of instruction in a cockpit setting with a student who is new to the content being taught.

Many flight instructors simply mimic their past flight instructors, employing instructional behaviors that they found helpful to them as a student and avoiding instructional behaviors they didn’t like (Henley, 1995). Unfortunately, behaviors instructors found helpful when they were a student may not be beneficial to their particular student who may come from a different culture, gender, or learning style (Turney, Karp, Niemczyk, Green, Sitler & Bishop, 2001). In this example, instructors are employing instructional behaviors without considering different learning styles (Moore, Lehrer, & Telfer, 2001). Instruction at a deep level of understanding must be tailored to the diverse needs of any student (Henley & Bye, 2003).

Researchers have developed a multitude of learning style research studies which show that a student learns best when the instructor adapts their method of instruction to meet their learning style.
needs (Bye & Henley, 2003; Henley & Bye, 2003; Karp, et al., 1999; Turney, et al., 2001). In aviation education, much of the literature focuses on using more of an androgogical approach to training adults rather than pedagogical. Androgogy is the belief that learners are of the age (i.e. adult) where they are self-motivated and self-regulated learners, whereas in pedagogy the students’ learning must be regulated and guided by the educator similar to educating children (Bye & Henley, 2003; Hunt, 2003; Karp, et al., 1999; Knowles, 1980; Moore, Lehrer, & Telfer, 2001; Niemczyk & Savenye, 2005; Thatcher, 1997; Wilt, et al., 2001).

Another hindrance to the training of flight instructors may reside with the validity of the practical test itself. Determination of the three main aspects of validity, content, criterion, and construct is critical to every assessment measure. Content validity assesses whether the test covers the actual content necessary for the job (Blickensderfer, et al., 2007). Criterion validity assesses whether the measurement of the knowledge or skills can be generalized to actual job performance (Blickensderfer, et al., 2007). Both of these constitute two aspects of construct validity that are necessary for a test to yield meaning (Blickensderfer, et al., 2007; Messick, 1995).

Most of the maneuvers required on the practical test lack content and/or criterion validity (Blickensderfer, et al., 2007). The decision of whether or not an applicant passes the practical exam is at the discretion of the Designated Pilot Examiner who observes the applicant. Researchers have determined that examiners have widely varying views of competency (Henley, 1995; Hunt, 2001). A survey of 195 flight instructors and 40 examiners on the validity of the practical test for flight instructor applicants found that over 65 percent of the flight instructors in Canada, and over 85 percent of the flight instructors in Australia said that the practical test did not provide a reliable and valid measure of their competence as flight instructors (Henley, 1995). Most of those individuals surveyed indicated that the practical test was focused on pleasing the whims and biases of the examiners or stated that the value of the test depended on the examiner (Henley, 1995). Even though these surveys were gathered through interviews in Canada and Australia, flight instructors in the United States share a very similar training process and may face the same problems (Wright, 2003; Blickensderfer, et al., 2007).

There are several different methods that have been used to measure flight instructor competence, from paper and pencil tests to surveys (Krumm, 1954). In December, 1954, Richard L. Krumm released the findings of his investigation measuring the competency of flight instructors. He used paper and pencil questionnaires to assess and survey instructors, supervisors, and students on quality flight instruction. Based on the results of his investigation, Krumm (1954) determined that his use of paper and pencil questionnaires did not accurately reveal flight instructor competencies. Henley and Bye (2003) also surveyed flight instructors, examiners, and students on their experiences during aviation instruction. The survey results revealed 40 percent of student pilots reported that the instructor was the major source of psychological stress during flight training (Henley, 2003). At the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology in Dayton, Ohio, Okdeh presented research on instructor and student behaviors while instructing in an airplane and a simulator (Okdeh, Bradshaw, Brou, & Done, 2007). He expected the instructor behavior to synchronize with Graesser, Person, and Magliano’s (1995) five-step model for effective one-on-one instruction, when in fact this model was non-existent. This model, also called the “tutoring frame,” follows the following steps:

1. Tutor asks an initiating question
2. Student provides an answer
3. Tutor gives feedback on an answer
4. Tutor improves quality of answer through collaborative conversation
5. Tutor assesses students understanding of the answer. (Okdeh, et al. 2007)

In the first step the tutor asks an initiating question in order to narrow the focus of the content. In step two the student provides an answer which
helps the instructor gauge the student’s comprehension of the problem. The instructor can then ask follow up questions and suggestions depending on the student’s response to the question. For example, if the instructor asks why lift decreases in a turn, and the student incorrectly responds with “because angle of attack increases,” the instructor might say, “remember what happens to the horizontal component of lift in a turn?” If the student is still struggling, the instructor may continue probing the student with questions in order to assess gaps in his or her knowledge. Based on the student’s response, the instructor will provide the necessary feedback in order to assist the student in acquiring the necessary knowledge in step three.

In step four, the student and instructor enter a collaborative conversation to further enhance the student’s understanding of the topic. Then, in the final step, the instructor determines whether the student has learned the material through questioning. Okdeh’s observations discovered that ninety-eight percent of the utterances were from the instructor and only two percent were from the student. Further examination revealed that the instructors never asked a question. Okdeh’s conclusion found that Graesser’s tutoring model may not apply to flight instruction and that flight instructors received their feedback from the aircraft flight instruments rather than the student. This type of behavior could be the result of poor training on how to properly conduct one-on-one instruction.

Another hindrance to the training of flight instructors lies with role-playing, which when used correctly can be a powerful instructional and learning tool. Most literature on role-playing describes its use in a classroom setting where students break into groups or work as a class to role-play (Billings & Halstead, 2005). There is no empirical research, however, that indicates role-playing is effective in aviation flight training where the instructor takes part in the role-play activity rather than acting as a facilitator. Flight instructors use role-playing to a large extent by pretending to be a student while their trainee pretends to be a flight instructor during training. Then, during the practical exam the Designated Pilot Examiner role-plays as their student. Role playing in this context is confusing, unrealistic, and lacks flexibility and is understood by the FAA as a problem in the United States (Henley, 1995; Wright, 2003).

When an instructor or examiner is role-playing, guiding the instructor trainee with questions oftentimes makes the applicant feel elementary and the questions artificial (Henley, 1995). Many instructors from Henley’s research indicated that role-playing does not accurately portray the actual quality or ability of the instructor (Henley, 1995). Flight instructors should be cautious in regards to generalizing the results of role-playing from other fields, such as elementary education, clinical psychology, and medicine since the instructor in these fields typically do not participate in the role-playing exercise but serve as a facilitator (Kraus, 2008; Penny, 2008; Waters, 1992). Because of these issues found in flight instruction, it was necessary to conduct an investigation that could aid in the improvement in flight instructor training. This research, therefore, focused on the effect that role-playing may have on the behaviors exhibited by the flight instrument instructor trainee. The researchers hypothesized that the orientation of the student, whether he or she is an actual flight instrument student or a fellow flight instrument instructor candidate, will make a difference on the flight instructor trainee’s behavior.

**Methodology**

This study consisted of observing the behaviors of student flight instructors while instructing actual students versus the behaviors used while instructing their peers. This study included video-recording student pilots while flying on an ELITE PI-126 Personal Computer Personal Computer-Aided Training Device (PCATD). The instructional sessions were coded by watching the video and recording observed behaviors using Noldus Observer XT with keystrokes on a laptop. This program has been used in a previous study where researchers coded instructor behaviors in order to look for patterns of behavior (Fitzgerald, Andrews, Crow, Karp, & Anderson, 2008).
Participants

The instructors-in-training held a commercial certificate with an instrument rating and were working toward obtaining their Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) certificate. These instructors-in-training instructed either students or peers at the discretion of the course instructor. The students were aware they were being recorded for the purposes of this investigation. Consent forms were signed by all participants.

Instructional Sessions

The class sessions that were observed were part of a structured class that the researcher was granted permission to attend and observe. It was not possible for the researcher to modify any of the variables in this study other than when to record and when not to record as the class was solely under the classroom instructor’s control. During a class period, an instructor trainee taught a lesson on an instrument skill such as a hold, instrument approach, or similar skill at the direction of the course instructor. Each lesson lasted about 25 minutes and included a five minute brief and a five minute debrief period.

Only the actual in-flight instruction was recorded and subsequently coded. The study was conducted over two consecutive semesters during a Certified Flight Instructor Instrument (CFII) ground school. Fifty-two sessions of instructor trainees were observed. Thirty-seven of these sessions were instructor trainees teaching actual instrument students, and 15 were instructor trainees teaching a classmate who was role-playing as a student. Peer students were not given any guidance by the course instructor for role-playing other than to pretend they were a beginning instrument student.

Behavior Codes

A set of essential instructor skills was developed based on instructor competencies as defined by the International Board of Standards for Training Effective Flight Instructors (IBSTPI) during previous research (Fitzgerald et al., 2008; Klein, Spector, Grabowski, & de la Teja, 2004). IBSTPI gathered many different instructors from a variety of fields to develop a detailed description of the standards for instruction. The researchers gathered a list of observable behaviors that should be exhibited from instructors according to these standards. These behaviors were modified to reflect behaviors specific to flight instruction that were identified through discussions with subject matter experts and through observation of flight instruction on a simulator.

Finally, these behaviors have been defined in the Noldus Observer data collection software package for the coding of observations (See Table 1). The researcher used Noldus Observer XT to keep track of which behaviors were being exhibited during the simulator session. When viewing the recordings, the researcher would record these behaviors using keystrokes. For instance, if the instructor trainee asked a question the researcher would type “ip” for instructor pilot, and then “aq” for the behavior. The type of behavior in this case, “asks a question,” would be recorded as occurring at that particular time by the instructor.

Data Analysis and Results

Behavioral measurements are in rate per minute (RPM) because the simulator sessions are not all the same length. A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with a 95 percent confidence interval. The MANOVA between the group of instructors who taught an actual student versus the group of instructors that taught a peer student revealed that the following behaviors were significantly different in their RPM of occurrence: provides positive feedback, $F(1)=4.863, p=0.032$; clarifies, $F(1)=10.125, p=0.003$; provide direct, $F(6.017), p=0.018$; and reduce workload, $F(1)=8.777, p=0.005$. Overall, the two groups were significantly different, $F(9,42)=3.220, p=0.005$, $R^2=0.408$ (See Table 2). Box’s Test to evaluate the variance and covariance among the dependent variables was significant, $F(45, 2515.134)=1.633$, etc.
This is due to the unequal sample size between the two groups which was uncontrollable by the researcher.

Descriptive statistics revealed the following top occurring behaviors for each group were different. The top three occurring behaviors for the group instructing actual students were: provide direct (1.13 rate of occurrence per minute), direct instruction (1.08), and asks a question (0.53). The top three occurring behaviors for the group instructing their peers were: direct instruction (1.10), provide direct (0.82), and reduce workload (0.61). See Tables 3 and 4 for descriptive statistics for each group. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics in RPMs for the instructors who were teaching actual students. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the instructors who were teaching their peers.

Table 1.

Instructor Behavior Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>Instructor makes a brief statement like “uh huh,” “Okay,” etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responds to a question</td>
<td>Instructor responds to a student question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asks a question</td>
<td>Instructor asks a question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explains task</td>
<td>Instructor explains an upcoming task.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce workload</td>
<td>Instructor configures something on the panel for the student.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Instruct</td>
<td>Instructor says a true statement such as, “we are over the airport,” “You’re heading 320,” etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide direct</td>
<td>Instructor gives a command such as “turn to a heading of 320.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarifies</td>
<td>Instructor recognizes an area where a student seems weak and elaborates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides positive feedback</td>
<td>Instructor gives positive feedback such as “great job on maintaining your altitude.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.

Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) on type of student

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of student</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.220</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.

*Rate Per Minute (RPM) Instructor Behaviors for All 37 Actual Student Sessions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responds to question</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asks a question</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explains task</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce workload</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct instruct</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide direct</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarifies</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide positive feedback</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.

*Rate Per Minute (RPM) Instructor Behaviors for All 15 Peer Student Sessions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responds to question</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asks a question</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explains task</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce workload</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct instruct</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide direct</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarifies</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide positive feedback</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the instructors who were teaching peers who were role-playing as students.

Discussion

The results seem to indicate that there was a statistical difference in the behaviors the instructor used when teaching an actual student or a peer. A significantly different frequency of behaviors was observed when the instructor was teaching someone who was role-playing as a student. This frequency changed when they began instructing a student who was not role-playing. Recall that instructor applicants are trained and examined in a role-play environment. After receiving their certificate they begin instructing a real student. Since the behaviors exhibited in a role-play environment seem to be different than those when instructing a real student, it is questionable how well they may be prepared to train in this environment.

The instructor trainee’s behavior changed depending on whether their student was an actual student or a role-playing peer. Perhaps they were changing their instruction in order to meet the needs of a diverse student. If this is the case, however, it would be expected that they would use these same techniques when instructing someone who is role-playing. The data seems to indicate that the role-playing environment may not be realistic, as Henley’s (1995) surveys have shown. A role-playing peer, examiner, or instructor may not behave like a real student causing the behaviors of the instructor to be different than if a real student were present.

Another interesting result of the investigation was the top three behaviors for each group. The most frequently occurring behavior for the group that instructed actual students was “provides direct.” This is a commanding behavior, where the instructor was telling the student to do something. The other two top occurring behaviors for this group were “direct instruct” and “asks a question.” Direct instruction was any truism stated by the instructor such as, “We are over the VOR,” or “You are descending at 200 feet per minute.” Asking a question was the third most popular behavior exhibited by this group. Okdeh’s et al. (2007) research on Graesser’s model of effective one-on-one instruction expected this behavior to be much more frequent, evidence that this research lends support to Okdeh’s et al. claim that Graesser’s tutoring model may not apply to flight instruction. Overall, the group teaching the actual students used commands, true statements, and questions as their top three behaviors for instruction.

The group teaching their peers exhibited a different order of behaviors. The most frequently occurring behavior was “direct instruct,” where the instructor shared a truism. The second most frequent behavior was “provide direct,” where the instructor gave a command, and the third most frequent behavior was “reduce workload” where the instructor did something on the console for the student. An example of reducing the student’s workload could be putting in frequencies for the student into the avionics or changing their heading bug. Overall, the top three behaviors exhibited by the instructor were true statements, commands, and reducing the workload for the student. It appears that when compared to the group teaching actual students, this group worked more as crew members than an example of instruction. The instructor seemed to make general true statements regarding the aircrafts’ status in order to keep the crew on the same page, giving commands when necessary, and then aiding to reduce the workload when necessary.

The group of instructors that taught actual students seemed to give commands to direct the student, use true statements to guide their thinking, and then ask questions to probe the students understanding. It is important to recognize these differences because instructor trainees are being trained in a role-playing environment similar to the instructor group teaching their peers. Based on these findings, it may be beneficial to modify the training environment since it appears to change their behavior.

Conclusion

In order to train flight instructors in a more realistic environment, it may be necessary to utilize a three person training structure consisting of a
Certified Flight Instructor (CFI), the instructor applicant, and an actual student. In this scenario, the instructor applicant would be practicing instruction on an actual student while being mentored by a CFI. This could create a much more realistic training environment for the instructor applicant. A notion of a three person training structure was suggested by many interviewees in Henley’s aforementioned research (Henley, 1995). An added benefit to this training structure would be that both students could split the costs of the instructor and the airplane or simulator. Not all training aircraft can accommodate three people, so compromises would have to be made. This training structure is not intended to be used for every lesson in the instructor applicant’s training, due to the fact that the applicant would need to first develop their skills to the point where they could be ready for the challenges of teaching an actual student.

Future Research

The next step in this line of research is to observe flight instructors as they conduct flight training in an actual aircraft in order to determine whether these observed behavioral changes translate into the flight environment. Since this is where flight instruction primarily resides, further research is necessary to observe flight instructors in this setting.

Analysis into the interaction of the student and the instructor could also reveal positive and negative techniques for aviation instruction. Focus groups could analyze instructional techniques and determine which were more effective. They could also determine those that were not effective or used improperly. Gold Seal flight instructors have a pass rate of eight out of ten students on practical exams and are considered experts in their field. Their behaviors could be coded to determine what behavioral patterns they exhibit, and they could be surveyed to determine how their training was different than the population of non-Gold Seal instructors. The behaviors of struggling instructor trainees could be compared to those of Gold Seal instructors to determine differences in instructional behavior. Since flight instructors use role-play to train future instructors, it may be beneficial to further educate them on more effective techniques for applying role-play in the aviation context.

In conclusion, the results of statistical analyses revealed a significant difference in the behaviors of instructors depending on whether they taught an actual student or a peer who was role-playing as a student. The reason for this behavioral difference is not clearly evident from this research, but prior research from the industry indicates role-playing may be being applied in the aviation setting improperly. It is suggested that a three person training team consisting of a CFI, instructor trainee, and a student be utilized. Suggestions for further research include taking this type of research from the simulator to the cockpit, as well as observing expert flight instructor behaviors.

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Aviation Maintenance Human Factors in a Systems Context: Implications for Training

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Acknowledgement
This research was funded by FAA grant #2003-G-013. A special thank you to Dr. Matt Grawitch for his comments on an early draft of the manuscript, and to Dr. Brent Bowen for additional comments and review. Thanks are also extended to the Federal Aviation Administration for their support.

Abstract
Previous evaluation efforts in maintenance resource management (MRM) training programs in the aviation industry have taken a piecemeal approach that fails to consistently consider training in an organizational systems context. Here, indicators of behavior prior to and following an MRM training program in place at a commercial air carrier’s maintenance facilities were assessed. Of particular interest was whether a previously established systems model could be applied in order to provide more effective training implementation. Structural equation modeling procedures found evidence to support using a systems framework to develop and assess safety training in industry.

Aviation Maintenance Human Factors in a Systems Context: Implications for Training

Training in technical or industrial organizations can be a unique challenge. Trainers must often deal with not only presenting the desired material, but also doing so across multiple employee shifts and within the constraints of government or union regulations. Trainers who must teach “soft skills”, such as those addressing human factors errors and issues in the aviation industry, have the additional challenge of presenting information to an organizational culture that often prides itself on being able to “tough it out” and remain task-focused regardless of the situation. This does not mean, however, that human factors issues should be de-emphasized in these settings; to the contrary, it is just in these types of organizations that there is the greatest need for a clear and empirical understanding of how to train and assess human factors issues and their contributions to safety and errors. Aviation organizations are significantly invested in identifying and appropriately measuring factors that may affect safety performance. One example of this is the significant growth of interest in intra- and interpersonal human factors as sources of error (Patankar and Taylor, 2008).

“Human factors” refers to the science and application of human performance findings in an operational system, incorporating methods and principles from several sciences and including the
study of variables that influence individual and team performance (Air Transport Association, 2002). Examples of these variables may include stress/fatigue, the physical nature of the work environment, interpersonal communication patterns, relationships with supervisors, and other social, psychological, and contextual variables.

The increased concern with the role of human factors in aviation incidents, accidents, and errors has led to the development of several human-factors related training programs. There is Crew Resource Management (CRM) for flight crews, and more recently, Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) training has been developed for aviation maintenance technicians. Reviews of a series of notable aircraft accidents in the 1970s (NTSB, 1973; Roitsch, Babcock, & Edmunds, 1977; NTSB, 1979) spurred the development of crew resource management (CRM) training for pilots and flight crews (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999), and maintenance resource management (MRM) training for aviation maintenance workers. These training programs intended to address the inter- and intra-personal issues underlying a significant percentage of the aircraft accidents at that time, between 60 and 80 percent (FAA, 1990).

Development and Assessment of MRM Training

According to Taylor and Patankar (2001), the first reported CRM program designed for aviation maintenance workers began in November 1989; this and other programs eventually became known as MRM programs after the term “Maintenance Resource Management” was coined in 1992 (Taylor & Christensen, 1998). The FAA defines the concept of MRM as a “process for improving communication, effectiveness and safety in aircraft maintenance operations” (2000, p. 6), that was developed to address “teamwork deficiencies within the aviation maintenance environment” (p. 6).

The fourth (and most recent) generation of MRM training programs reviewed by Taylor and Patankar (2001) has attempted to correct the weaknesses of previous iterations by incorporating organizational systems theory, focusing on active error reduction, and promoting a structured communication process. As Taylor and Patankar (2001) describe, interest in systems theory has grown in the aviation industry, particularly with regard to MRM training. Many MRM researchers have called for the implementation of systems-based approaches to describing and evaluating MRM, and stressed the importance of viewing maintenance human factors issues as depending on, and interacting with, environmental and contextual factors (e.g., Latorrela & Prabhu, 2000; Taylor, 2000a). MRM trainers are encouraged by the FAA to teach organizational systems theory to maintenance technicians, in order to put human factors in the context of the larger organization (FAA, 2000). Additionally, the FAA stresses systems theory particularly for maintenance technicians because of their greater likelihood (compared to flight crews) to commit latent (rather than active) errors, mistakes that may neither have an effect for weeks or even months following the incident, nor become evident for crews during normal operation (FAA, 2000).

The general goal of contemporary MRM training, then, is to integrate the existing technical skills of maintenance employees with interpersonal skills and human factors knowledge; this should in turn improve communication effectiveness and in turn enhance safety in maintenance operations (FAA, 2000). The FAA suggests that a successful MRM training program not only teaches error avoidance, but also the adoption of attitudes that support a culture of safety. Because MRM training should incorporate a systems perspective (FAA, 2000), all levels of employees are encouraged to participate and receive MRM training, and evaluations of MRM training should attempt to capture changes in attitudes that may contribute to latent as well as active errors.

MRM Training Evaluation

Based on the development and goals of CRM training programs, the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) was developed to assess flight crew attitudes regarding human factors issues, and has been found useful for train-
ing, evaluation, and research in CRM (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & Russini, 1986). Just as MRM evolved from initial efforts involving flight crews, so too did evaluation methodologies for MRM training evolve from those initially created to assess flight crew changes following CRM. Taggart (1990) was among the first to adapt CRM evaluation methods for the maintenance environment, revising the Cockpit Management questionnaire for use with aviation maintenance employees. Taylor and Robertson (1995) then modified Taggart’s revision, calling their survey the Crew Resource Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire, later renamed the Maintenance Resource Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ).

Research on the CMAQ (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990; Sherman, 1992) confirmed four constructs that were predicted to appear based on the survey items given to flight crews: communication/coordination, shared command responsibility, recognition of stress effects, and avoidance of interpersonal conflict, though Gregorich et al. found that the conflict avoidance factor was inconsistent in their sample of CRM data and discarded it in subsequent analyses. Gregorich et al. also found a positive post-training shift in attitudes among participants, as well as a decrease in the variability of responses following CRM training; these results indicated a positive effect of the CRM training program on this sample of flight crew members. Helmreich, et al. (1986) similarly found the CMAQ to be useful, reporting a substantial link between attitude change measured by the CMAQ and line flying performance behaviors.

Aviation industry accident/incident reviews (such as those conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board and internal industry reviewers) suggest that behaviors related to these four constructs underlie many of the human factors errors that have occurred in the past. In addition, these four constructs do incorporate aspects of a systems approach to promoting safety by attempting to gauge alignment among organizational factors such as leadership with interpersonal factors such as communication and conflict avoidance. The CMAQ, and later, the MRM/TOQ were both designed to measure changes in these four attitude constructs prior to and immediately following resource management training.

While the four attitude constructs that make up the primary MRM training assessment tool have been identified and described, the relationships among these constructs have not yet been clearly determined. If systems theory is indeed an important basis for understanding the implications of human factors errors (as suggested by the FAA, 2000), research must move beyond analyzing the components of MRM training and work to understand how those components interact with one another, as they do in organizations, to affect change intentions and overall training outcomes.

**Utility of the MRM/TOQ**

Data collected on CRM training has been connected to specific organizational and individual performance/outcome variables and task behaviors (e.g., Helmreich et al., 1986), but little work has been done to similarly connect MRM training to particular outcome measures. Much of the research conducted using the MRM/TOQ (e.g., Taylor, 2000a; Taylor, 2000b; Taylor & Thomas, 2003) has focused on identification of the four factors and the relevant items to measure each; however, the interrelationships among the four factors have not yet been closely examined, nor have there been any systematic attempts to understand how these four critical areas of human factors training might fit into existing frameworks of aviation safety and performance (e.g., quality as described by Bowen & Headley, 2009).

One exception to these statements is the work of Fogarty (2003) and Fogarty, Saunders, and Collyer (2001), which focused on developing and testing a multilevel model to predict aviation maintenance performance. Their model (initially described in Fogarty et al., 1999) indicates that workplace factors such as coworker support, supervision, and feedback affect employee morale and health, which in turn affect job intentions and maintenance errors. These authors do not use the MRM/TOQ to assess employee attitudes, relying instead on the Main-
tenance Environment Scale (MES), developed for their study. This survey asks few direct questions about attitudes, and focuses instead on contextual factors that may affect performance. The work of Fogarty and his colleagues provide support for the notion that individual and organizational-level variables may impact safety; however, their research has not studied the impact of human factors training on these variables, nor has it measured changes in MES variables over time (for example, the attitudinal changes measured by the pre-training MRM/TOQ and post-training MRM/TOQ).

A comprehensive model for training allows development, implementation, evaluation, and eventually return on investment to be integrated into a single process, facilitating assessment of the efficacy of these types of programs in reducing human factors errors and improving safety. There are models already found in the aviation literature that may fill this need. The maintenance performance model created by Fogarty et al. (1999) and the purpose-alignment-control (PAC) model created by Patankar, Bigda-Peyton, Sabin, Brown, and Kelly (2005) may be the most well-suited of these models to be adapted from a more general safety focus to serve as training-specific systems models.

The PAC model gets its name from the three concepts that are theorized to tie the model’s components together. Purpose refers to the ability of teams to collapse constraints, self-organize, and focus on goals. Alignment refers to the necessity of coordinating both individual and organizational resources when a purpose is clearly defined; while control refers to the notion that individuals and teams are willing and able to maintain alignment toward problem resolution when they believe that they have control over the outcomes. Patankar et al. suggest that the components listed in the model are those that need to first be “purposefully aligned” in order for subsequent components to come into alignment, and that a sense of control with regard to the components is a critical aspect of an active approach to safety. Early, partial tests of the PAC model with flight crew-related safety data (Block, Sabin, & Patankar, 2007) indicate the model has substantial potential to describe and eventually predict safety-related attitudes and behaviors in an aviation setting.

**Purpose of the Present Study**

There are several conceptual similarities between the PAC model and the Fogarty et al. (1999) maintenance model. Both models begin with organizational input factors; however, the PAC model splits these contextual variables into “organizational” and “team” factors, and suggests that the former affects the latter, while the Fogarty et al. model keeps all of these conditions grouped into a single factor. Because both models are attempts to provide a framework for discussing safety in aviation, the present study compares the various perspectives within each model to determine which general model is most appropriate as a framework for improving MRM training. Partial tests of the PAC model and the Fogarty et al. (1999) model may improve understanding of the nature of the relationships among the variables and factors, and may provide guidance as to which model may best benefit from additional development for future human factors training.

Both of these models have several advantages for analysis relevant to the remaining purposes of the present study: (1) both were developed using aviation organizations (minimizing the need for translation to specific organizational facets of the organization used in the present study), (2) both specify a number of individual and organizational variables as potential inputs (consistent with systems theory), and (3) both are grounded in past discussions of CRM and MRM training. The development of empirical support for a systems model (such as these) may also provide a necessary first step in identifying key leverage points for incorporating MRM training as a tool to improve safety culture.

The present study begins the process of filling this substantial gap in aviation maintenance research by empirically integrating a systems framework into maintenance training implementation. In addition, the work of Gregorich et al. (1990) with regard to CRM among flight crews should be
replicated in a maintenance setting if their work is to continue to serve as the basis for maintenance training tools. Gregorich et al. (1990) conducted confirmatory factor analyses across three different samples to assess the factor structure of the CMAQ with flight crew employees. Similar exploratory work by Taylor (2000b), found different results than those presented by Gregorich et al. (such as strong evidence for the conflict avoidance factor among maintenance workers), increasing the level of ambiguity regarding the four factors that result from evaluations of resource management training.

The present study has a threefold purpose: (1) to confirm or disconfirm the factor structure identified by Taylor (2000b); (2) to test whether the pattern of attitude change identified by Gregorich et al. (1990) for flight crews is consistent with attitude change patterns in aviation maintenance employees, and (3) to partially test two models that describe the relationships among pre- and post-training employee attitudes, general satisfaction, and intentions for behavioral change following safety-related training, in order to identify which model best fits the relevant maintenance training data. Selection of a best-fitting model provides the foundations for developing an evidence-based systems framework for assessing and improving maintenance human factors training programs.

**Research Design**

**Maintenance Technicians**

Participants were 1458 employees at seven aircraft maintenance and line repair centers for a United States-based airline, who had participated in MRM training within the past 14 months. Participants were asked to complete the MRM/TOQ immediately before the MRM class started, and again at the end of the day (immediately following training). The MRM training program was conducted during the mechanics’ normal work schedule and lasted for approximately eight hours. The mean age of respondents was 49.74 years (SD = 8.03), mean years in maintenance at the current organization was 17.55 (SD = 7.07), and most participants were male (96.6%).

**Maintenance Resource Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ)**

Data were collected using the Maintenance Resource Management/Technical Operations Questionnaire (MRM/TOQ). The MRM/TOQ is a 17-item questionnaire developed to measure the attitudes and intentions of participants in airline maintenance communication and safety training workshops (Taylor, 2000b). Reliability and validity of the MRM/TOQ were previously assessed by Taylor (2000b), who reported adequate reliability (with regard to both stability and consistency) as well as evidence of good concurrent and construct validity in the instrument. Measurement of Cronbach’s alpha as a gauge of internal consistency ranged between 0.51 and 0.77 per scale for the four attitude areas among aircraft maintenance technicians.

**Results**

Basic demographic information and broad differences among groups were initially evaluated to ensure that results found in subsequent analyses were not based on pre-existing differences (e.g., differences found among the various work sites on other variables were not affected by significant differences in mean age or years of experience). Analysis of variance (ANOVA) results indicate that there were no differences among the seven sites on mean age ($F_{7, 608} = 1.81$, ns). There were significant differences in years at the organization across the seven sites ($F_{7, 1362} = 7.323$, $p < 0.05$). Post hoc analyses (Scheffé procedure) indicated that these significant differences were between site one ($N = 646$) and sites two ($N = 279$) and five ($N = 90$), and between site four ($N = 132$) and site five. Post hoc (Scheffé) results indicate site five participants report significantly fewer years’ experience compared to sites one, three, and seven. No other differences among the sites on this variable were
found when sample size discrepancies were taken into account, and each of the seven sites demonstrated comparable demographic information.

**Factor Comparisons**

Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) using the LISREL statistical software program were conducted for both the pre- and post-training data to ascertain if the four-factor structure (communication/coordination, relational supervision, recognition of stress effects, and conflict avoidance) described by Taylor (2000b) for maintenance employees using the MRM/TOQ was consistent with the present data sample (Block, et al., 2009). Results of these factor analyses are presented in Table 1. For pre-MRM training data Taylor’s four-factor structure failed to converge when all items were included. Eliminating the weakest item (“A truly professional team member can leave personal problems behind when working”) allowed a four-factor structure to

Table 1

*Pre-Post Training Data Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Three Factor Structure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication/Coordination</th>
<th>Pre-Training</th>
<th>Post-Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employees should make the effort to foster open, honest, and sincere communication.</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We should always provide both written and verbal turnover to the oncoming shift.</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My work impacts passenger satisfaction/safety.</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A debriefing and critique of procedures and decisions after a significant task is completed is an important part of developing and maintaining effective crew coordination.</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having the trust and confidence of my coworkers is important.</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start of shift maintenance crew meetings are important for safety and for effective crew management.</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My coworkers value consistency between words and actions.</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Relational Supervision                                                                  |              |              |
| My supervisor can be trusted.                                                           | 0.77         | 0.83         |
| My supervisor protects confidential or sensitive information.                           | 0.74         | 0.79         |
| Mechanics' ideas are carried up the line.                                               | 0.57         | 0.67         |
| My suggestions about safety would be acted on if I expressed them to my lead or supervisor. | 0.62         | 0.74         |
| I know the proper channels to route questions regarding safety practices.               | 0.54         | 0.55         |

| Conflict Avoidance                                                                      |              |              |
| It is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and techniques of other team members. | 0.81         | 0.75         |
| Maintenance personnel should avoid disagreeing with one another.                        | 0.56         | 0.71         |
converge, but still indicated poor item loadings for the two remaining items related to “recognition of stress effects” (λ = 0.15 and -1.55). Complete elimination of the stress effects factor did not decrease the fit of the data: root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.046, Tucker-Lewis index = 0.98, and comparative fit index = 0.98 (for three-factor structure).

For post-training data the initial four-factor solution converged, but again indicated poor lambda values for “recognition of stress effects” (λ = 0.05, -0.19, and -0.25); the CFA procedure was re-run with a three-factor structure, and results of this may also be seen in Table 1. Eliminating the stress effects factor contributed to a slight improvement in the RMSEA (from 0.061 to 0.056); other fit indices were unchanged by the removal of this factor: Tucker-Lewis index = 0.98, and comparative fit index = 0.98 for the three-factor structure. The data indicate the factor that should be eliminated or modified when evaluating maintenance training is not conflict avoidance (as suggested by Gregorich et al., 1990, for flight crew data), but rather recognition of stress effects.

**Pre-Post Training Comparisons**

Reliability of items within each factor was also measured, using Cronbach’s alpha. Gregorich et al. (1990) reported moderate reliability levels in the flight crew data for the three factors on which they focused (Cronbach’s alpha ranging between 0.47 and 0.67). Reliability scores for the present data sample were good for two of the four factors (communication/coordination, α = 0.82 before and α = 0.86 after training; relational supervision, α = 0.73 before and α = 0.80 after training). Reliability for the areas of conflict avoidance and stress recognition, however, varied from moderate to very weak: conflict avoidance, α = 0.54 before and α = 0.62 after training; stress recognition, α = 0.29 before and α = 0.28 after training.

In order to facilitate analysis of the four factors identified in the CFA procedure, composite scores were created by summing participants’ responses to items within each factor (a procedure also conducted by Gregorich et al. (1990) for their analysis of flight crew data). Responses for items 1 (“maintenance personnel should avoid disagreeing with one another”); 2 (“even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical phases of work”); 5 (“it is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and techniques of other team members”), and 9 (“a truly professional team member can leave personal problems behind when working”) were reverse-scored, so that higher responses following training would be indicative of effective MRM training. To test whether the same pattern of significant pre- and post-training attitude changes would be represented in the present data as was found by Gregorich et al. (1990), a repeated-measures ANOVA procedure was performed on each pair of pre- and post-training composite scores, including site location and type of maintenance job held by participants as potential interacting variables. This is similar to the cross-organization and cross-job title analyses conducted by Gregorich et al.

Results of analysis showed a significant main effect of training for two of the four factors: communication/coordination (F_{1,1249} = 4.48, p < 0.05) and conflict avoidance (F_{1,1249} = 17.42, p < 0.05). Analysis of the remaining two factors showed marginally significant change following training: F_{1,1249} = 3.12, p = 0.07 for relational supervision; F_{1,1249} = 3.75, p = 0.053 for recognition of stress effects. These results, however, may be due more to the large sample size contributing to the liberality of the F-test rather than to the presence of meaningful post-training differences (e.g., the net change in the composite score on relational supervision from pre- to post-training is 0.54, slightly more than one-half of one scale point). None of the interactions between any of the four factors and site locations or job type were significant.

According to Gregorich et al. (1990), if resource management training was successful there should be diminished response variation following training; and if training enhanced pre-existing attitudes, response variation is likely to have increased following training. To determine whether such a variance reduction had occurred in the present sample, a t-test for the difference between correlated vari-
variances (e.g., testing for heterogeneity of variance) (Gregorich et al., 1990; Ferguson, 1971; Howell, 2002) was computed for each pair of pre- and post-training factor scores. Contrary to results obtained by Gregorich et al., only the relational supervision and conflict avoidance factors showed a significant change in variability following training, and both of those factors actually demonstrated increased variability following MRM training, rather than the anticipated decrease in mean variability. Prior to MRM training, the mean variability (Howell, 2002) for the relational supervision factor was $s^2 = 18.55$; following training the mean variability was $s^2 = 20.00$ ($t_{1457} = -2.595, p < 0.01$). Prior to MRM training the mean variability for conflict avoidance was $s^2 = 4.98$; following training the mean variability for this factor was $s^2 = 5.89$ ($t_{1457} = -5.378, p < 0.001$).

### Model Tests

To ascertain whether the PAC model provides better overall fit with the MRM/TOQ results (compared to Fogarty et al.’s 1999 model), partial tests of both models were conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM). When using SEM, judging model fit through use of a single index is considered insufficient (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004), as each index has various strengths/weaknesses. Fit indices used in the present study are the goodness of fit index (GFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and comparative fit index (CFI). The GFI is a general fit index that measures the amount of variance and covariance in a sample matrix that is predicted by the reproduced matrix. The RMSEA is a global measure of model fit; and finally, the comparative fit index compares the hypothesized model with a null model in which all latent constructs are assumed to be uncorrelated (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Additionally, standardized path coefficients indicate the strength of the relationship among the latent constructs.

In tests of Fogarty et al.’s (1999) model, the four post-training attitude areas from the MRM/TOQ provide data analogous to the “workplace” factor described by Fogarty et al. Morale in the model is defined by three items related to outcomes of training (“this training has the potential to increase aviation safety and crew effectiveness”; “this training will be useful for others”; and “is the training going to change your behavior on the job”).

Lambda values for each item suggest that a portion of the items serve as reasonable indicators of their respective constructs (though items related to the factor ‘recognition of stress effects’ exhibited λ values below 0.29). Overall fit indices indicated a moderate amount of fit with the data: goodness of fit index (GFI) = 0.86, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.054, and comparative fit index (CFI) = 0.98.

Observation of the standardized path coefficients (betas), however, suggests that the Fogarty et al. model is not the best structure for this data. Even after correcting the model to exclude weak items and the entire recognition of stress effects factor, the paths between the three remaining factors and morale decreased (for relational supervision, $\beta = 0.21$; for communication/coordination, $\beta = 0.53$; and for conflict avoidance, $\beta = 0.05$).

The PAC model (Patankar et al., 2005) was initially tested as described with two of the four MRM/TOQ attitude areas loading onto the organizational factors latent construct and two loading onto the team factors construct through a process of purposeful alignment (Patankar et al., 2005); however, organizing the four attitude areas in this way did not provide a valid model based on the data. Because the previously reported factor analyses divided MRM/TOQ items into four distinct attitude areas (even with weak items for the fourth factor), it was thought that the reason for non-convergence may lie in the attempt to create a second-order factor structure (“organizational” and “team” factors) out of these relatively independent attitude areas.

To further clarify the model and ensure alignment with both the MRM/TOQ factor analyses as well as the theoretical concepts behind the PAC model, the PAC model was then retested with “organizational factors” consisting of the communication/coordination items of the MRM/TOQ and “team factors” consisting of the three supervisory trust items (“my supervisor can be trusted”; “my
suggestions about safety would be acted on if I expressed them to my lead or supervisor”; and “my supervisor protects confidential or sensitive information”). Contributing to the team factors construct was conflict avoidance, which contained two items (“maintenance personnel should avoid disagreeing with one another”; and “it is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and techniques of other crew members”). Adding conflict avoidance as a separate factor contributing to supervisory trust (the team factor) maintains the distinctions between these two constructs present in the confirmatory factor analysis while still linking them theoretically as is described in Patankar et al.’s (2005) PAC model. This new construct thus predicted the team factors construct, but did not directly measure team factors. This also seems to better fit the relationships hypothesized by Patankar et al. with regard to the components of organizational and team factors needing alignment to have a controlled influence on outcome variables. Items with poor fit and any related to “recognition of stress effects” were eliminated from the final model test. Lambda values for each of the MRM/TOQ items can be seen in Table 2.

Results of this final PAC model analysis offered improved support for the general structure of the PAC model while providing a more parsimonious model of the data. As can be seen in Figure 1 (page 22), while relationships among the three general constructs (organizational factors, team factors, and outcomes) remained very similar compared to the initial PAC model, the factor structure shown in the figure is now more consistent with the struc-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Item Weights for Items Tested in PAC mode**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>λ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18. This training has the potential to increase aviation safety and crew effectiveness.</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. This training will be useful for others.</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication/Coordination</th>
<th>λ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8. Having the trust and confidence of my coworkers is important.</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. We should always provide both written and verbal turnover to the oncoming shift.</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Employees should make the effort to foster open, honest, and sincere communication.</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. My work impacts passenger satisfaction/safety.</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. A debriefing and critique of procedures and decisions after a significant task is completed is an important part of developing and maintaining effective crew coordination.</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Start of shift maintenance crew meetings are important for safety and for effective crew management.</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Factors (Relational Supervision)</th>
<th>λ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. My suggestions about safety would be acted on if I expressed them to my lead or supervisor.</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. My supervisor protects confidential or sensitive information.</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. My supervisor can be trusted.</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Avoidance</th>
<th>λ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Maintenance personnel should avoid disagreeing with one another.</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and techniques of other team members.</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ture of the MRM/TOQ attitude areas. Additionally, by dividing items for the team factors area into the attitude areas conceptually and empirically identified by both Taylor (2000b) and Patankar et al. (2005) and confirmed in the present study, value on the GFI has improved to 0.92, while the RMSEA improved to 0.047, and the CFI improved to 0.99. The chi-square value decreased from $\chi^2_{149} = 931.49$ to $\chi^2_{60} = 197.30$ with the adjustment of the model to incorporate the conflict avoidance factor and eliminate poor items (those with $\lambda$ values below 0.70).

**Discussion**

Understanding the role of human factors in the aviation industry is a complex challenge, balancing individual attitudes with systemic organizational and inter-organizational factors. This study sought to explore the attitude changes occurring in a real-world training situation, and to discuss the application of enhanced training assessments to improve MRM training, human-factors based safety attitudes, and the measurement of training effectiveness.

Attempts to confirm the four-factor structure identified by Taylor (2000b) and provide additional support for the use of the MRM/TOQ in assessing MRM training produced mixed results. While the conflict avoidance factor (characterized by the items “maintenance personnel should avoid disagreeing with one another” and “it is important to avoid negative comments about the procedures and techniques of other team members”) has been found to be inconsistent and under-identified in samples of flight crews (Gregorich et al., 1990), both Taylor (2000b) and the present study found consistent responses for this factor among maintenance employees.

There are several possible reasons for this distinction between the two broad categories of aviation employees. Perhaps maintenance employees perceive interpersonal disagreements and procedural disagreements as highly similar types of conflict, whereas flight crews make a distinction between the two – this may cause the items to diverge and contribute to inconsistent results for flight crews on this factor. Additionally, the format of conflict training for maintenance employees may differ in approach from that used with flight crews, leading to discrepancies in interpretation of this factor. These results emphasize the need to properly tailor both the training programs and the evaluation methods to the desired audience to maximize training effectiveness.
The present study found little support for continued inclusion of the “recognition of stress effects” factor in MRM training assessments, at least in its current format. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated a poor degree of item fit for the three items intended to measure stress recognition, inter-item reliability was quite low, and the factor contributed little to the systems-based training model tested. The observed data on this factor strongly suggest that modifications are warranted for either 1) items used in the MRM/TOQ to measure understanding and agreement with the stress recognition portion of human factors training; or 2) the method of presentation of stress recognition information in the MRM courses. The data on this factor indicate a conceptual disconnect between the teaching of stress recognition as it is currently provided in MRM training courses and the understanding of stress recognition as it is captured by the current MRM/TOQ. Perhaps maintenance employees do not perceive the relationship between the stress and safety outcomes, questionnaire items are being misinterpreted, or the material is not being clearly explained during training. If the industry wishes to continue emphasizing the importance of stress recognition as a component of MRM training, the measurement methods for this factor or the methodology of instruction for this factor must be reviewed and corrected to improve the quality and accuracy of assessment, and the congruence between training and measurement.

Conclusions

Analysis of the systems-based model for training assessment presented here (via the combination of confirmatory factor analysis and structural modeling analysis) identified key areas in MRM training that require either program or assessment modification in order to optimize the training and evaluation of maintenance employees. While results suggest that MRM training offers many benefits to employees who participate, the discovery of poor consistency between flight crews and maintenance in the measurement of conflict avoidance training, and the poor item fit and reliability for the three items designed to measure stress recognition training suggest that these factors should be revised if the MRM/TOQ is to continue to be used to assess training outcomes.

The differences in the consistency of the conflict avoidance factor between flight crews and maintenance employees may indicate that there are differences in the material emphasized for flight crews and the material emphasized for maintenance employees (such that conflict avoidance is given more time/weight in MRM courses), that flight crews and maintenance employees have different mental concepts for “conflict avoidance”, or that conflict avoidance is a more relevant concept for maintenance employees. Alternatively, these differences in the order and consistency of the factor structure for these items suggest that there are different characteristics of the flight crew and maintenance populations, and that these differences should be taken into account when modeling attitude change, developing resource management training, or making comparisons on outcomes between the two groups.

In its present state, the stress recognition items do not contribute unique information about the impact of MRM training. Assuming that stress recognition is indeed an important component of safety-related human factors training for the organization (which it should be), modification of the items is needed to assess the success of stress training initiatives. Replication of analyses conducted by Gregorich et al. (1990) found several areas in which maintenance and flight crew employees responded in similar fashion to resource management training. The difference in factor structure between the two populations, however, suggests the presence of underlying differences in perception of or approach to training that should be considered when industry leaders take existing training programs and present them to new audiences. There is clearly a need for substantive modifications to such programs if they are to achieve maximum effectiveness in addressing the organization’s training goals for that audience.

The partial tests of the PAC model presented here provide evidence suggesting that many of the relationships described by Patankar et al. (2005) as
indicative of a safety culture are present in safety-related training. While the present study was limited in the availability of data that could be entered into tests of the model (e.g., no objective outcome data, the availability of only a portion of the data for each of the three main constructs in the model), even these partial tests of the model indicate its utility as a systems-based framework for the design and evaluation of future MRM training programs. Given the increasing demand within the aviation industry for comprehensive approaches to training design and assessment (described above), such a model is a key first step in understanding the nature of successful human factors training programs.

Future Research

These findings indicate a clear need for continued follow-up of MRM training programs using a comprehensive, systems-based approach to evaluation. In addition, systems-based training includes the ability to link attitude changes that occur in MRM training programs to on-the-job behavioral change; these linkages can begin to be measured and understood based on the relationships theorized in the PAC model. Additional research is greatly needed to link such training programs to multiple concrete outcomes, as well as linking back to the training methods and materials used in presenting MRM, using the PAC model as the conceptual framework for an iterative design-assess-redesign process.

The results presented here may provide the impetus for additional research on the PAC model and encourage the gathering of data to test a more complete version of the model. Results of the present study should also encourage aviation organizations to review their methodology for measuring the impact of MRM training, and to make appropriate revisions to their assessment tools in order to provide the most useful and accurate data. In addition, the need for frequent and systemically-oriented approaches to the review and modification of the training programs themselves for the various employees groups has been highlighted by these findings. The critical nature of human factors-related safety attitudes in aviation and other high-consequence industries, and the need for training programs that properly present and assess these attitudes in a way useful to the organization, can only truly be understood when examined using a systems-theory based approach. The model and results of this study provide a new step in this key direction.

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Fogarty, G. J. (2003). Errors, violations, and reporting behaviour in aviation maintenance. In R. Jensen (ed), Proceedings of the Twelfth In-


Safety Culture: The Perception of Taiwan’s Aviation Leaders

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Abstract

One of the outcomes of implementing Safety Management Systems (SMS) is to improve and reinforce the safety culture for an organization. Since 2003, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has promoted SMS implementation in its contracting States and introduced a safety management guidebook in 2006, namely Doc. 9859 Safety Management Manual (SMM) (ICAO, 2006). Furthermore, these obligations were enacted into the ICAO Annexes requiring SMS implementation in their international airlines, airports, air traffic control, accident investigation and aircraft maintenance facilities before January 2010. This study aims to discover the status of safety culture after the initiation of SMS in 2008 in Taiwan. Using convenient sampling and Delphi technique, survey participants were selected from attendees of an SMS recurrent workshop in Taipei, Taiwan in July 2010. The findings identified the status of safety culture according to the four categorized sub-cultures: Informed, Reporting, Just and Learning cultures. The results show many critical issues such as excessive top-down pressure, disregarding reported hazards, low-usage of the hazard reporting system, and skeptical managerial capability. A thorough list of findings and recommendations are provided in this paper for the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Republic of China (CAA-ROC) to promote airport safety. This methodology would be applicable to other aviation and high risk organizations as an initial indicator of their baseline safety culture.

Background

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has required its contracting States to implement Safety Management Systems (SMS) within the international airport system according to the ICAO Annex 14 (ICAO, 2008). In 2004, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began distributing its own System Safety Handbook and related safety management documents (AC 120-92, 2006; AC 150/5200-37, 2007; Administrative Order 8000.1, 2006; and Order 8000.367, 2008) to the aviation community to improve the overall quality of safety metrics. In 2010, the U.S. Congress enacted the “Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010.” The new law not only requires a higher pilot training standard, but also mandates airlines to implement SMS (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010). Currently, the four SMS underpinning components – Safety Policy, Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion – are guiding the industry toward future integration of aviation safety management programs. As noted in the results of ICAO Safety Audits, many airports have already spent significant resources to comply with the requirements of ICAO SMS.

Taiwan has a rapidly growing air transportation industry, especially the cross Taiwan Strait flights to and from China. Although Taiwan is not an official member of ICAO, Taiwan’s aviation authority adopts most guidelines, standards, best practices and recommendations from the international community for achieving the highest level...
of safety. The SMS implementation is no exception to this observation. Noticeably, Taiwan has been the test-bed for some new safety programs that will eventually be implemented in China. The integration of SMS in Taiwan’s airport industry and safety culture will be a great show-case example for the booming Greater China aviation community. In 2008, two aviation professors from Purdue University were invited to Taiwan to conduct a 5-day ICAO-FAA SMS workshop for airline and airport managers and government officials. The SMS workshop has created a baseline for future safety culture measurements. It had been two years since the last SMS workshop, and therefore a status review of SMS in Taiwan was recommended. On July 20th, 2010, two Purdue University professors were again invited to Taiwan to conduct a survey to discover airport employees' perceptions of safety culture and consequently assess SMS implementation outcomes. This paper reviews that process and the summary findings.

Literature Review

Human error and accidents will continue to challenge the aviation industry. With this in mind, continuously providing safety education to airport operators is a fundamental means to identify and mitigate unforeseen hazards. The ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM) is a guidebook for all contracting States to systematically design and implement SMS for airport operations. Based on system safety concepts, the contents of ICAO SMM cover basic safety theories to an overall roadmap of SMS implementation (ICAO, 2006). The ultimate outcomes of the ICAO SMM are an integration of safety systems and a positive safety culture within an organization. As addressed in the SMM, the content includes: the definition of risk, acceptable level of risk, responsibility assigned to personnel, regulatory compliance, safety performance, safety education and management, risk management and hazard reporting system, risk analysis and investigation, periodic audit and monitoring, and available safety management tools (ICAO, 2006).

Human Elements in a Safety System

According to Military Standard 882D (MIL-STD-882D) Standard Practice for System Safety, a system is defined as “an integrated composite of people, products, and processes that provide a capability to satisfy a stated need or objective” (Department of Defense [DoD], 2000, p.2). Human operators are considered an essential component within a system and are vital to the success of a safety management system. Human factors are the most dynamic aspect in an aviation safety program because humans react to new ideas, environmental change, societal movements, interactions, and significant insights (Petersen, 1988; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Wood, 2003). Furthermore, humans change positions and occasionally react differently to similar stimuli. Moreover human behavior is constantly being affected by culture, peer pressure, environment, physical condition, training, level of satisfaction, personal beliefs, etc. Human behavior is different from individual to individual based on various factors occurring at any given time. For example, emotional state, mental status, preoccupation mindset, motivation factors, complacency tendency, and personality traits can vary due to the living standard, lifestyle, educational level, or even someone’s childhood, which can have an indeterminable effect (Orlady & Orlady, 1999; Petersen, 1988; Wood, 2003).

Another way human behavior is influenced is through modeling, the so-called learning through imitation (Petersen, 1988). According to Dan Petersen’s model, if one would like to maximize learning in workers, one must exhibit the behavior himself/herself (Petersen, 1988). Thus, management must set the example if they want the employees to behave within acceptable limits. The old phrase “leadership by example” is definitely applicable. In a high-consequence industry, such as airport and airline operations, the workers’ willingness to respond effectively is critical to ensure safety (Reason, 1997). Petersen (1988) has also shown the positive correlation between attitudes and safety results. In the current system safety concept, management’s commitment is identified to be the foundation to an effective safety system (FAA, 2006, 2007; ICAO, 2006; Reason, 1997).

Besides, the human-machine interface will always be a concern under the discussion of human factors. The human-machine interface can be either a successful design or a trap, depending on many operational factors such as mission demands, supervisory pressure, adequacy of supervi-
sion, leadership, communication, teamwork, and competency (Ericson, 2005; Vincoli, 1993; Wells & Rodrigues, 2004). Designing a system, including a safety system, to minimize and anticipate human/operator errors is a priority. To further address safety, it is extremely important to determine methods to assist operators or workers identify, report, and mitigate observed hazards or voluntarily make hazards visible to managers (Bowen & Lu, 2000). This effort needs a positive safety culture supported by the top management people. As top management’s support is a critical component of a successful safety system, knowing how management prioritizes and leverages available information or systems to promote additional safety culture improvements is essential (ICAO, 2006; FAA, 2006 & 2007; Wood, 2003).

The Publications of Safety Management Systems (SMS)

In addition to many tailored SMS manuals published by various countries, in the U.S. there are several publications related to SMS that the airport industry can utilize to enhance safety performance. These publications are: 1) Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-37 Introduction to Safety Management System for Airport Operators, 2) AC 120-92 Introduction to Safety Management Systems for Air Operators, 3) ICAO Doc. 9859 Safety Management Manual (SMM), 4) FAA System Safety Handbook (FAA, 2000), and 5) MIL-STD-882D Standard Practice for System Safety. In addition, Purdue University’s previous project (Lu, Bos, Caldwell, 2007) proposed a preliminary SMS model (see Appendix A) to build up the needed safety culture (with four sub-cultures: informed, reporting, just, and learning/adaptive) for airports, air carriers, manufacturers, fix-based operators, traffic control system, regulatory agencies, and higher education institutions.

Building Up the Safety Culture

The Safety Culture “refers to the personal dedication and accountability of individuals engaged in any activity that has a bearing on the safe provision” (FAA, 2005, p.5). “Safety Culture is the set of enduring values and attitudes regarding safety issues, shared by every member of every level of an organization” (Piers, Montijn, & Balk, 2009, p.2.). Without a doubt, the core accomplishment of SMS is to create a better safety culture to maintain and further improve the entire system’s safety. In 2010, the Office of the Auditor of the City and County of Denver, Colorado conducted an audit on safety culture across different working units under the Department of Aviation. The itemized audit was based on SMS criterions and had revealed that safety culture is a positive element at Denver International Airport (DIA). DIA possesses the design of safety policy, implementation of safety training, conduction of job hazard analysis and creation of airport safety committee to identify, analyze and mitigate potential hazards (City and County of Denver, 2010). However, some challenges were also recommended such as ascertaining management commitment, improving employee collaboration, elevating the recognition of safety programs, building a no-fault near-miss reporting system, and identifying a better way to collect and disseminate safety information (City and County of Denver, 2010). A key indicator of management’s commitment to safety is the adequacy of resources, including financial support and empowerment from the top management (Simon & Cistaro, 2009). Of course, a bottom-up support from union workers is equally critical (Liss & Wagner, 2004). Establishing a management structure, assigning responsibility and accountability, and allocating appropriate resources must be consistent with the organization’s stated safety objectives (FAA, 2007). The FAA’s recommendation has been echoed by the Society of Petroleum Engineers (2008) and many others. Discussing safety must begin with the analysis and understanding of an existing culture. Safety is the status of a hazard-free condition. Culture is a behavioral norm consisting of beliefs, attitudes, and common values of an organization (Lu, Przetak, & Wetmore, 2005). The culture is more concrete and embraces the structures, practices, controls, and policies that an organization possesses and employs (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Thus a safety culture is the engine that drives the organization towards the goal of maximum attainable operational safety regardless of any formats of resistances, obstacles and pressures.

A positive safety culture instills respect among the employees and managers of the organization
that operational hazards and errors should be anticipated. A safety culture is therefore an informed culture in which administration, management, and front-line employees are aware of the current status of operation. An informed culture is a known process in which people are familiar with the elements of a company setting such as plans, policies, procedures, guidelines, programs, personnel, possible hazards, and, of course, safety expectations. This informed culture also recursively measures the performance of the safety practice (Reason, 1997; Reason & Hobbs, 2003).

A good safety culture of an organization is also a reporting culture that can only be achieved by creating an atmosphere of trust in which people are willing to divulge their errors as well as near misses. Utilizing the analogy of an iceberg, it has been determined that top management is aware of only about 4% of the significant safety problems, with line managers aware of only 9% and supervisors aware of about 74% (ICAO, 2006). Thus, identifying untold safety deficiencies is essential to having an accurate view of the safety system of an organization. Only by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information about past events and close calls, can the organization locate where boundaries between safe and unsafe acts originate (Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Lu, Bos, & Caldwell, 2007). In a reporting culture, management needs to implement protection for employees. Also, the process of data collection and analysis, feedback, appreciation, and ease of making a valid report are critical (Reason, 1997; Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Wood, 2003). One must also be on the lookout for overly aggressive reports associated with adverse conditions that are judged fairly.

A culture is a just culture when it agrees and understands the difference between unintentional and intentional acts. Intentional negligence warrants a punishment approach, while unintentional errors require a non-punitive resolution. The positive recognition in addition to punitive measures should be clearly established to facilitate the growth of a reporting culture and a firm belief of fairness. Creating a trustworthy and just environment will promote safety performance and efficacy and should be one of the organization’s goals/objectives (DoD, 2000; Lu, Wetmore & Przetak, 2006; Reason, 1997; Reason & Hobbs, 2003). Even with a just culture, there are many barriers to overcome before a reporting culture can be fully shaped. The first barrier is the natural attitude of ridicule. The second barrier is the suspicion that the report may go on record and act as a form of potential backlash. The third is skepticism of the data application. If one makes an observation on a weakness, people want to know that management will respond to the submission. The fourth barrier is resignation, which is a feeling of lack of empowerment or contribution. With this in mind, an effective feedback loop and righteous process must be in place.

A safe culture is a learning (adaptive) culture in which both reactive and proactive measures are used to guide continuous education and wide-reaching system improvements rather than mere local fixes. A learning culture is ineffective without reporting, informed, and just cultures so as to acquire current data and monitor past trends that may recur. This culture is always aware of the potential risks and is aware of the past risks associated with any given procedure (Reason, 1997).

**Changing Culture**

A culture change is an organizational transformation of a company’s beliefs. It involves the changing of values and norms among employees in order to improve productivity, both in military and public sectors. A safety policy should first be adopted to provide a fundamental guideline and blueprint that will be embraced within an organization. A safety policy further defines the organization’s commitment to safety and overall safety vision (ICAO, 2006; FAA, 2006 & 2007). ICAO further requires the identification of an accountable executive from the top executives (an identifiable person having the responsibility for the effective and efficient performance of the organization). This person has the authority to assign resources to fulfill the obligations of the Safety Management System with resources for this SMS leadership position (ICAO SMM, 2009, p.8-4). Implementing a culture change is introspective, so imposing a cultural change in an organization may meet with substantial resistance. It is also essential to commit resources for the long term and to clearly identify a phased implementation approach. Using existing forms, structures, manpower and active roles from the bottom-up within
Research Question

What is the status of Taiwan’s airport safety culture after the implementation of the ICAO Doc. 9859, FAA AC 150-5200/37 and Civil Aeronautics Administration’s (CAA) safety programs?

The main research question contained 69 sub-questions covering four sub-cultures and four SMS components/pillars (See Appendices B & C).

Merits of the study

A safe airport would provide a better working environment for its employees, tenants such as airlines, fixed base operators (FBOs), traffic controllers, business vendors, and of course passengers. Therefore, a periodic safety review of an airport’s safety culture, based on international standards, is merited.

Research MethodologyParticipants

Purposive sample was applied due to the convenience of data collection and the advanced experience of research participants, namely Key Informants (KIs). A KI is an expert for a specific research area who has been involved in the daily activities within an operational setting. Therefore, the collected data from KIs are deemed creditable. In addition, the authors used Delphi technique which provides respondents the preliminary findings for verification in order to gain the reliability of the collected data. Delphi technique is “an interactive process to collect and distill the anonymous judgments of experts using a series of data collection and analysis techniques interspersed with feedback” (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007, p. 1). The Delphi technique uses a “survey-review-survey” cycle to refine collected data from research participants and finalize the data credibility and reliability (Ali, 2005).

MIL-STD-882 Risk Matrix

The key to developing most risk assessment tools is the characterization of a risk itself by severity and probability. The highest system safety precedence is to eliminate hazards by re-designing a system (Petersen, 1988); therefore a risk assessment procedure considering only risk severity could generally suffice during the early design phase. When all hazards cannot be eliminated during the early design phase, a risk assessment procedure based upon the risk probability as well as the risk severity provides a resultant safety indication. Risk assessment is used to establish priorities for corrective actions, resolutions of identified hazards, and notification to management of the identified and significant risks (DoD, 2000).

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In this study KIIs were selected airport managers and government officials of CAA in Taiwan who attended the Taiwan Airport Safety Workshop in July 2010. A survey questionnaire was distributed to 114 attendees of the safety workshop in Taipei. Respondents were asked to answer a questionnaire related to SMS components, current status, perception of program performance, and airport safety culture.

**Key Informants**

The data collection and analysis process started on July 20th and was closed on August 10th, 2010. Table 1 provides all targeted primary and secondary airports in Taiwan.

Table 1

*Targeted research participants from commercial airports in Taiwan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airport (IATA code)</th>
<th>Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary International Airports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei Songshang International Airport (TSA)</td>
<td>Taipei City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taoyuang CKS International Airport (TPE)</td>
<td>Dayuang, Taoyuang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung Shiaogang International Airport (KHH)</td>
<td>Shiaogang, Kaohsiung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Airports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung CCK Airport (RMQ)</td>
<td>Taichung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ChiaYi Shuishang Airport (CYI)</td>
<td>Shuishan, ChiaYi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan Airport (TNN)</td>
<td>Tainan City, Tainan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingdong Henchung Airport (HCN)</td>
<td>Henchung, Pindong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingdong Airport (PIF)</td>
<td>Pindong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taidong Fennien Airport (TTT)</td>
<td>Taidong City, Taidong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualien Airport (HUN)</td>
<td>Hualien City, Hualien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penhu Magong Airport (MZG)</td>
<td>Magong, Penhu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cimei Magong Airport (CMJ)</td>
<td>Cimei, Penhu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang-an Airport (WOT)</td>
<td>Penhu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henchun Airport (HCN)</td>
<td>Henchun, Pindong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinmen ShanYi Airport (KNH)</td>
<td>Kinmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsu Airport (MFK)</td>
<td>Machu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanyu Airport (KYD)</td>
<td>Lanyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyudao Airport (GNI)</td>
<td>Lyudao</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Questionnaire Design**

The questionnaire was drafted based on FAA AC 150/5200-37, FAA System Safety Handbook, Transport Canada’s model (Transport Canada, 2008) and ICAO Doc. 9859, pilot-tested by safety experts, and then a final version of the survey was completed for targeted aviation experts. The questionnaire was validated through a pilot test in spring 2010. In addition, the original questionnaire was translated from English to Mandarin by one of the researchers who is a native Mandarin-speaker so survey respondents could provide their answers accurately in their native language. The questionnaire design was based on a theoretical basis rooted in the literature review and SMS-
related documents published by ICAO, the U.S. FAA, and Transport Canada in addition to FAA AC 120-92, AC 150/5200-37, VC Order 8000.1, VC Order 8000.367 leading to the safety culture checklists developed by Purdue University researchers. Comments and answers from airport managers and tenants were stored in a secured database using Purdue University’s QUALTRICS online survey and data analysis system (see Appendix B).

The research activities include the investigation of an airport’s SMS implementation results regarding:

1. SMS gap analysis per ICAO/FAA or mandatory contents from local government
2. SMS airport policy and mission
3. SMS internal publication(s) and manual(s)
4. SMS ongoing hazard report(s) and management
5. SMS risk analysis, format(s), and mechanism(s)
6. SMS audit standard(s) and assurance study(ies)
7. SMS educational/training program(s)
8. SMS continuous system and sub-system quality assurance
9. SMS networking and information sharing means
10. SMS safety culture evaluation tool(s)
11. SMS recurrent seminar(s), meeting(s), and conference(s)
12. SMS safety award program(s)
13. SMS committee setting
14. SMS collaborative effort and synergy within the company

Findings

In order to accurately report the survey results, the research findings followed the questions listed on the questionnaire (both in English and Mandarin). There were two components of this section: 1) findings that needed a follow-up study and 2) findings that reflected a positive safety culture. Due to the lengthy narrative, this report provides the top 10 safety concerns and the top 10 indicators of positive perceptions of the safety culture.

Basic Information

A majority of survey respondents (80%) were from three primary commercial airports, namely Taipei Songshan International Airport, Taoyuang CKS International Airport and Kaohsiung International Airport. Overall, 39% of respondents held management positions from airports, airlines, and government. With the assistance from Flight Safety Foundation—Taiwan and Civil Aeronautics Administration the respondent rate was 56.1%. Delphi technique was used to gain the research reliability and creditability, therefore, on September 15, 2010, the initial analytical finding was sent back to Taiwan and was distributed to research participants for their further comments. A QUALTRICS survey was prepared for additional comments, and the online commenting mechanism was closed on October 20, 2010. Additional comments had resulted in some wording changes per se but no significant comments had altered the initial findings.

Top 10 cultural items recommended for follow up study

Table 2 provides the results of the top 10 concerns regarding airport safety culture, while Appendix C presents additional ranking results associated with other questions.

Additional comments regarding respondents’ safety concerns are as follows (translated from Mandarin to English):

- Strengthening jet bridge maintenance. Broken jet-bridge should not happen again which affects the national image.
- I am worried about airport Foreign Object Damage (FOD) events and jet bridge failure.
• I am worried about apron, worker and aircraft safety.
• Regardless of a professional decision-making capability, political involvement, unrealistic purchasing budget, and top-down enforcement do happen. As a result, the government must take the responsibility if any undesired events happen.
• Political influence and media distortion about the airport safety status is a concern.
• Outdated and high failure rate of the equipment. Maintenance standard and schedule do not meet the current mandatory requirement.
• We have a preventive data analysis but not proactive. Currently, it is more like a reactive system.
• My airport will be privatized. If my airport employs too many foreign low-quality workers, safety could be affected.
• X-ray machine’s effectiveness is problematic. Security personnel quality is also questionable. Alternative/backup security measures should be in place once the system is defective.
• The training and understanding of airport security must be enforced.

Table 2

Top 10 airport safety culture concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Concern %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>“I feel top down pressure from top management”</td>
<td>81% respondents agree with the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“My airport values my hazard reports”</td>
<td>68% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>“I have used airport hazards reporting system”</td>
<td>67% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>“I am worried about the quality of airport managers”</td>
<td>65% respondents were worried about the quality of airport managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>“My airport accepts occasional mistakes”</td>
<td>64% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>“My airport promptly adopts new safety standards without going through the lengthy bureaucratic process”</td>
<td>63% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>“My airport provides sufficient safety education”</td>
<td>62% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>“Airport management cares about manpower and organizational accident issues”</td>
<td>61% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>“I believe that whistle blowers can be protected”</td>
<td>60% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>“I am worried about airport safety training facilities”</td>
<td>58% respondents do worry about airport safety training facilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• A high turnover rate on the top management would weaken the managerial performance.

• Airport managers need more safety education and training.

• Top management must receive training (safety and management). Policymaking cannot be controlled by the media or press. We should focus on safety performance and efficiency. A long term safety investment is needed.

• Please provide more safety education and training to staffs. Staffs must clearly understand their own safety responsibility and role.

Findings that Reflect Positive Indicators for Future Safety Culture Change in Taiwan

While the safety culture survey reflected shortfalls and areas needing an improvement in the previous section, there were also findings that were plausible and need to be maintained (see Table 3).

Table 3
Top 10 positive indicators on airport safety culture change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Positive indicator %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>“Government must protect the whistle blowers using the hazard reporting system”</td>
<td>95% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“Airport safety tasks must be assigned to a person with quality and experience and be provided compatible stipend”</td>
<td>95% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>“Mission is more important than airport safety”</td>
<td>94% respondents do NOT support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>“A hazard reporting system would benefit an airport’s long term development”</td>
<td>94% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>“I support the hazard reporting system at my airport”</td>
<td>94% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>“Safety analysis must include proactive data and reactive data”</td>
<td>92% respondents do support the posted statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>“Erroneous decision-making could lead to undesired events”</td>
<td>90% respondents do support the posted statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>“An effective airport safety management depends on an effective data collection, analysis, and information distribution”</td>
<td>89% respondents do support the posted statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>“Occasional mistakes must be mitigated immediately”</td>
<td>89% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>“My airport has a long-term plan for safety education”</td>
<td>89% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional safety culture perceptions are presented in Appendix D.
Analysis

Purdue University’s QUALTRICS system provided additional analytical functions, such as cross-tabulation analysis. This analysis showed that:

1. From the perception of respondents, airport management personnel did not effectively support safety programs or allocate sufficient resources to accomplish determined safety goals. A proactive fashion of hazard collection was lax and decision-making processes needed to be improved. Thus, a process to resolve the prioritized potential hazards for a more cost-effective safety investment is urgently needed.

2. Safety training curricula, facilities, education and the quality of newly hired employees and managers were critically concerned.

3. Unintentional mistakes were not acceptable and could be punished which would discourage reporting of hidden hazards. Meanwhile, the airport policy did not fully encourage safety comments or clearly define an unintentional mistake, which reflected the low usage of the hazard reporting system.

4. There were 31% of respondents who were not aware of the existence of the airport hazard reporting system. Even if 69% respondents had recognized the existence of a hazard reporting system, 67% respondents did not use it. The reason may be that most respondents did not believe that: 1) the whistle blower of the reporting system could be protected, 2) the hazard report system was confidential, and 3) the investigation process of a reported hazard was investigated fairly. Because most respondents did not trust the reporting system, the situation may have led to the lack of usage of the safety information, alerts or notices.

5. Top down managerial pressure did exist which could reflect the resistance of using a hazard reporting system.

6. Removing organizational accidents was an important task which needed an immediate solution. However, the lengthy bureaucratic process/red-tape did concern most respondents.

7. More than half of the respondents (54%) noted that airport safety culture was not good.

8. The recent jet-bridge accident at a major airport had triggered an intensive investigation and the media closely scrutinized an airport’s operational safety. As a result, political influence could have outweighed professional recommendations regarding the decision-making process.

9. There were other concerns related to an airport’s operational safety including outdated equipment, foreign object damage (FOD) cases, high turnover rate of the top management personnel, lack of safety education to top management and staffs, poor airport security mechanisms, unclear non-punitive policy, and unqualified airport workers.

There were also some positive findings related to airport safety. They were:

1. Airport safety-related meetings were periodically held and represented by different sectors of the airport system including project contractors.

2. Respondents agreed that erroneous decision-making could lead to undesired events.

3. Safety data collection (proactive) was essential and critical to a safe airport operation.

4. Airport authorities did possess sufficient safety budgets.

5. Respondents indicated that being assigned with a safety related job was an honor and appointed safety inspectors must show quality and experience and should be awarded a compatible stipend.
6. Mission and airport safety may encounter conflicts but most respondents believed that safety should be the priority.

7. When choosing to use the hazard reporting system, most respondents were not worried about peer pressure. They also believed that the hazard report would not damage group harmony. They believed that the hazard reporting system would benefit an airport’s long term development.

8. Most respondents made mistakes. They also supported a hazard reporting system but government must protect the whistle blower of a hazard reporting system. Also the hazard reporting system must be confidential so they could feel more confident to report their own errors.

9. Most respondents agreed that safety education was a long term effort and lessons learned from events were very useful for them to improve safety. They also adopted new safety guidelines and standards promptly vis-à-vis the manner of the top management personnel.

10. Most respondents understood the difference between an intentional and unintentional act. Thus, most of them accepted discipline, including punishments, when an undesired event was due to an intentional act. Interestingly, most respondents believed that a large amount of reported hazards were unintentional mistakes.

11. Risk Matrix had been utilized by airports to judge reported hazards so proper safety measures could be enacted.

12. Although some undesired events happened and outdated equipment did exist, most respondents believed airport equipment and facilities were currently functional. But a backup system was recommended.

**Recommendations**

This study revealed the perceived status of safety culture in Taiwan’s airport system as of August 2010. In this section, the authors categorized and summarized the previous findings using the four safety sub-cultures and the four pillars of SMS to yield the following recommendation list.

1. Reporting culture — Database expansion and analysis is needed so a more cost-effective safety investment can be forged. The non-punitive policy must be clear to all employees.

2. Informed culture — Hazard reports must be encouraged because these support a feeling of contribution and recognition by the contributors and facilitate the data collection. A periodic summary report must be distributed to airport employees so they can be aware of the safety concerns, standards, priority and performance objectives.

3. Just culture — The hazard reporting system must be a trusted, confidential, and anonymous. The immunity policy associated with unintentional behaviors must be passed and promoted by the government so as to encourage and collect more hazard reports as well as safety suggestions.

4. Adaptive and learning culture — Promoting a proactive hazard collection system to airport employees and initiating an orientation regarding the current hazard reporting system and possible benefits is important. The benefit of using the hazard reporting system cannot be limited to front line workers, but also needs to be extended to top management personnel.

5. Policy — Most respondents did not trust the reporting system. Thus most of them did not use the system leading to the ignorance of safety information, alerts and notices. Top management’s support must be visible and physically tangible to airport workers. The lengthy bureaucratic red-tape should be avoided if safety issues are involved.
6. Safety Assurance — A two-way communication channel must be established between management level and front line supervisors in order to minimize any conflict between mission and safety emphasis. While periodic safety audits are useful, effective communication supports continuous safety compliance and assurance.

7. Risk management — Recent incidents, such as the collapsed jet-bridge and traffic controller’s carelessness at an airport, do reflect the lack of a proactive risk analysis, education and control. Any undesired events cause the media’s attention. It is highly recommended that the airport administration or government agency strengthen the role of public relations personnel in order to properly deal with the media and the law makers.

8. Safety promotion — Reducing FOD cases, improving ground/apron operation safety, creating a redundant airport security mechanism, enforcing safety policy, and employing more qualified, educated workers would reduce potential hazards associated with an airport’s operation.

As part of the safety knowledge associated with upper-level airport managers, an advanced recruitment program should be established. Also, a malleable and pedagogical method to provide safety education, skills and appropriate attitudes toward safety awareness and implementation is needed. Several programs are available through the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), International Air Transportation Association (IATA), Airport Council International (ACI), and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

Conclusion

This study surveyed Taiwan’s aviation (airport and airline) leaders’ perceptions about the current status of safety culture at major commercial airports in Taiwan. Through a third-party assessment, Taiwan’s aviation administration agency was able to identify the performance gaps of SMS implementation from the experts’ perceptions of the current safety culture. This study simultaneously identified the airports’ readiness, achievement and/or difficulties needing the government’s assistance per international criterions. With this information, Taiwan’s Civil Aeronautics Administration can prioritize resources for a more cost-effective safety investment. In all, airports and government oversight systems must closely collaborate in order to mitigate misunderstandings and achieve an acceptable level of safety within available time and financial resources.

Follow-Up Study

In order to continuously support Taiwan’s airport community in improving its safety culture after implementing SMS, a tangible, creditable, and reliable international research network must be formed to approach these safety goals. Furthermore, this process is applicable to many high consequence entities. Therefore, a similar safety study should be considered for other transportation industries developing safety management systems and safety culture.

References


**Appendix A**

Aviation Safety System Management (ASMM) Model

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Appendix B

Safety Culture Survey Questions

The following items are genuine components of the ICAO-FAA Safety Management System (SMS) that will guide an airport to meet the basic international standard. Please click on the item(s) that your airport currently possess and operate. Indicate your level of agreement using the scale of 1 through 5 where « 1 » represents Strongly Disagree and « 5 » Strongly Agree. Your responses will remain confidential and be stored in a security-enacted database. The data will be used only for the analysis of this study. Thank you for your assistance in completing this survey and for impacting the safety awareness of the global aviation community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(5) Strongly Agree</th>
<th>(4) Agree</th>
<th>(3) Fair</th>
<th>(2) Disagree</th>
<th>(1) Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Airport top management are committed to enhancing airport safety, and provide adequate resources to achieve this goal
- Airport safety meeting is always the priority at a meeting
- Airport safety meeting is always held on a regular basis
- Airport management conducts a thorough understanding of the airport incident, lessons learned, as a whole airport reform
- The unintentional cause of the accidents does not receive punishment
- Airport executives actively (proactively) maintain airport safety (such as found frequent minor errors and remove it)
- Airport top management’s decision-making errors can lead to accidents
- High-level decision-makers invest intensive efforts to reduce errors
- I believe that the organizational factors (training equipment, understaffed, incomplete training) can lead to accidents
- I believe that the organizational factors (training equipment, understaffed, incomplete training) are easier to improve
- Airport executives understand the organizational factors in the event (training equipment, insufficient training) are easier to improve
- An effective management of airport safety depends on the collection, analysis and dissemination of relevant safety information
- Safety data analysis must be combined with active (proactive) and passive (reactive) data means
- I am positive that my airport collect safety data
- My airport will identify important safety indicators in advance then provides remedial measures.
- I am worried about airport safety training facilities
- I am worried about airport safety training course
- I am worried about airport safety budget
- I am worried about the quality of airport worker selections
- I am worried about the quality of the airport managers
- Airport Safety Committee representatives are from different sectors (airlines, airports, etc.) of an airport
- Airport contractors must participate in safety meetings
- Assigned to an airport safety-related work (e.g.: safety management inspection) is an honor
- And airport safety-related work assignment must be based on adequate experience, quality and gain relative stipend
- Mission and airport safety may conflict
- I think airport safety is as important as the mission
• I think the missions are more important than safety
• I feel pressure from top-down
• I feel pressure from my own side
• My airport safety policies encourages people to report issues related to safety
• I know that my airport has a safety reporting system (hazard reporting system)
• I have used the airport safety reporting system
• Peer pressure may prohibit me from using the reporting system
• I am afraid that my hazard report may damage team harmony
• I think the Government should protect whistle-blowers who report hazards
• I think the whistle-blowers can be protected
• I think my safety reports are reviewed seriously
• I believe a safe reporting system could help develop airport safety
• I think the airport safety investigations are fair
• I trust airport safety system
• I support airport safety management system
• I use the airport safety information
• I regularly receive airport safety information
• My study of airport safety is a long-term process
• My airport’s policy of incident reports is clear
• I believe that my airport incident report is confidential
• I believe airport incident report should be confidential
• My airport sanction program is based on acceptable and unacceptable behavior
• I understand what is not an acceptable behavior
• Most airport incidents should not be punished. Unless the behavior is not acceptable (intentional)
• An act involving the intentional or reckless conduct must accept the punishment
• Airport safety training uses risk index (Risk Index)
• Airport management encouraged us to learn lessons from the accident, which helps prevent accidents from recurring
• My unit will adapt to the new airport safety standards without going through a lengthy bureaucratic process
• I can adapt quickly to new airport safety standards
• I believe that my airport has a good safety culture
• I believe I have been provided with adequate airport safety education
• I am worried about the airport safety policy
• I am worried about the airport facilities and equipment
• Airport executives are very concerned about the human and organizational issues, because the human and organizational factors could endanger airport operations
• My airport accepts occasional mistakes
• Occasional mistake must be mitigated immediately
• I sometimes make mistakes
• I must receive training to learn how to report my own mistakes
• I have undergone intensive trainings to find and solve airport operational problems
## Appendix C

### Airport Safety Culture Concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Concern %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>“I am worried about the quality of airport employees”</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>“A reported hazard is confidential at my airport”</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>“My airport prioritizes safety issues and mitigates them accordingly”</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>“I receive airport safety information periodically”</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>“I use the hazard reports”</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>“My airport has a good safety culture”</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>“Airport management proactively maintains airport safety by frequently discovering and mitigating small errors and mistakes”</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>“I am worried about airport safety training curriculum”</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>“My airport collects proactive safety data”</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>“Top management believes that organizational factors (lack of safety equipment, personnel, training, airport design etc.) are easier to be corrected”</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>“After an accident investigation, personal unintentional acts are not punished”</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>“The investigation of a reported hazard is systemic and fair”</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>“Airport management investigates any undesired events and adopts lessons learned to improve safety”</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>“I believe that organizational factors (lack of safety equipment, personnel, training, airport design etc.) are easier to be corrected”</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>“The pressure is from myself”</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>“The immunity policy of accidents or incidents at my airport is very clear”</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>“Top management actively reduces erroneous decision-making”</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>* Concern %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>“The top management has closely involved to promote airport safety and invested sufficient resources to achieve the determined safety goals”</td>
<td>37% respondents do not accept the posted statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>“I trust the hazard reporting system at my airport”</td>
<td>37% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>“I know that there is a hazard reporting system at my airport”</td>
<td>31% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>“Airport safety policy encourages us to provide safety comments”</td>
<td>31% respondents do not support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>“Airport safety related meetings are always a priority on the meeting agenda”</td>
<td>31% respondents do not accept the posted statement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix D**

Positive Airport Safety Culture Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>* Indicators (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>“I know sometimes, I make mistakes”</td>
<td>87% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>“I must be trained well to discover problems and solve them”</td>
<td>87% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>“I must be trained well to report my own errors”</td>
<td>86% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>“Airport safety meetings are represented by different sectors of airport employees”</td>
<td>86% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>“Intentional mistakes must be punished”</td>
<td>85% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>“Airport project contractors must attend safety meetings”</td>
<td>84% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>“Being assigned with safety related jobs is an honor”</td>
<td>84% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>“Airport safety related meetings are regularly conducted”</td>
<td>80% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>“My airport use Risk Matrix to judge a reported hazard”</td>
<td>80% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>“Airport management encourages me to learn from errors including my own mistakes”</td>
<td>80% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>“I understand the difference between an intentional and unintentional act”</td>
<td>79% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>“A reported hazard must be kept confidentially”</td>
<td>79% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>* Indicators (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>“Most reported hazards are unintentional”</td>
<td>74% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>“Mission completion and airport safety may encounter conflicts”</td>
<td>73% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>“Mission completion and airport safety are equally important”</td>
<td>73% respondents support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>“I can promptly adopt new safety standards”</td>
<td>72% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>“The punishment policy at my airport is based on intentional or unintentional acts”</td>
<td>71% respondents do support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>“I am worried about airport safety training budget”</td>
<td>69% respondents do NOT worry about airport safety training budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>“My hazard report may damage group harmony”</td>
<td>68% respondents do NOT support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>“Peer pressure may prohibit me from using the hazard reporting system”</td>
<td>66% respondents do NOT support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>“I am worried about airport safety policy”</td>
<td>63% respondents do NOT support the statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>“I am worried about airport equipment and facilities”</td>
<td>43% respondents do NOT support the statement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The percentage was a combination from “Strongly Agree” and “Agree”
Re-estimating and Remodeling General Aviation Operations

Ryan Black and Justin R. Chimka

University of Arkansas

Author Note

This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Award Number: “2008-ST-061-TS0003.” The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Abstract

Models previously created by GRA, Inc. for the Federal Aviation Administration to estimate total annual operations by general aviation (GA) airports have been recreated and examined by the authors. Models were originally estimated by GRA to predict the future size of airports, but research described here would go toward detection of unusual GA activity that might be due to a homeland security threat. Toward this end, the authors have systematically discovered a statistical model of GA operations that is more efficient than what the literature describes.

Re-estimating and Remodeling General Aviation Operations

Since September 11, many steps have been taken to improve security against attacks on commercial aviation, but relatively little has been done to secure general aviation (GA). One reason for the security gap is that GA operates differently than the commercial aviation industry making it difficult to borrow improvements. Another reason for lower GA security standards is that many people did not perceive GA as a serious threat, since planes carry much less fuel and are much smaller than their commercial counterparts. However, in February 2010 a suicide attacker crashed a single-engine plane onto an Austin IRS building killing one employee and injuring thirteen others. “Thousands of civilian aircraft fly within the general aviation system every day. But there are few regulations, laws, or security procedures that would prevent a pilot with ill intentions from using a plane for evil purposes (Lubold, 2010).”

To accommodate the need for improved GA security, one goal should be to integrate a variety of relevant data formats, “and transform raw data into useful and understandable information that enables productive and efficient analysis (IDS University Affiliate Center for Multimodal Information Access and Synthesis).” Our objective is to understand the variation associated with usual GA activity and operations, so unusual activity can be detected, analyzed, and resolved. General
techniques include estimation and design of relevant statistical model-based quality control charts. This opportunity to specialize in model-based control for an applied context should eventually result not only in contributions to GA security but also to quality engineering. The research described here improves upon previously existing models of GA operations data and would make possible improved monitoring and detection for GA security.

Motivation

The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s publication Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security includes the following: “Continue to improve intelligence and information sharing (Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2008).” However, while the University Affiliate Centers to the Institute for Discrete Sciences (IDS) were established by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for advanced methods research in information analysis, IDS activities focus on common author identification, influenza surveillance, and text analysis. What is described here is part of ongoing activities that will adopt and/or develop tools to derive knowledge specific to potential attacks against general aviation (GA). Additional activities would extend regression models of GA operations to the most appropriate of other contexts chosen among highway, maritime transportation systems, mass transit, pipeline systems, and rail.

Commercial examples relevant to GA include Incident Reports and Surveillance Detection Reports filed by Federal Air Marshals (FAM) and analyzed by law enforcement organizations in a Tactical Information Sharing System (TISS). FAM also place in TISS incident reports by airline employees, and the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program identifies unusual activity by utilizing behavioral analysis.

In the GA domain, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association have implemented an Airport Watch Program using pilots for reporting suspicious activity. TSA and the National Response Center (U.S. Coast Guard) have implemented the GA Hotline for airport operators, technicians, and pilots to report suspicious activity. However, there are not more formal information reporting and sharing systems available to GA. In order to design such effective systems, and make GA a more equal partner in homeland security, the following would seem to be important exploratory activities.

1. Consider what is relevant about commercial examples to GA and make recommendations for improved intelligence and information sharing which originates at GA landing facilities.

2. Reference the Airport Characteristics Measurement Tool (Transportation Security Administration, 2004) to develop reporting standards and analyze information that would come from reports.

3. Estimate and/or identify models of usual GA activity that could be used to detect potential attacks.

4. Extend the philosophy that if we can estimate good models of usual activity associated with transportation, then we can effectively monitor operations and detect unusual activity that may indicate a security threat.

5. Identify the other (in addition to GA) contexts that make the most sense physically for extension of lessons learned from GA. These would seem to be the ones to be most likely affected by unscheduled activity.

6. Explore the concept of a simultaneous, multi-context monitor that would integrate not only information from disparate sources within mode but also information across modes to enhance transportation security.

The research described here is most relevant to exploratory activity 3. Estimate and/or identify models of usual GA activity that could be used to detect potential attacks.
Literature

Soon after its description of the Top Ten Challenges, DHS released an article on strengthening GA security (DHS, 2008). The article describes an effort to minimize vulnerability to GA flights used to deliver illicit materials, transport dangerous weapons or people, or utilize aircrafts as weapons. DHS is implementing the Electronic Advance Passenger Information System (eAPIS), which will mandate GA operations have information about arriving and departing planes and the passengers and crew onboard that is more detailed. These data are sent through eAPIS or an approved alternate system one hour prior to departure for flights arriving into or departing from the United States.

NASA has been working on constructing an “Aviation Data Integration System (ADIS)” which provides rapid access to various data sources such as the following (Kulkarni, Wang, Windrem, Patel, & Keller, 2003): weather data, airport operation condition reports, radar data, runway visual data, navigational charts, radar track point records and track deviation, aircraft conditions, and Jeppesen charts. These data are integrated and analyzed along with what is collected by cockpit data recorders (time since flight start, latitude, longitude, altitude) to determine when aircraft are behaving abnormally.

Also taking steps to improve GA security is Transport Canada (2007). Phase II of their Electronic Collection of Air Transportation Statistics (ECATS) allows GA planes to submit air transportation data through web interfaces. This new data integration system should improve the timeliness and availability of air transport data for analysis and interpretation. Transport Canada uses current and secure information technology to collect and distribute data. A collaboration of GA entities and a partnership between the government and industry have allowed this high security information to be shared to improve GA security.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) releases a terminal area forecast summary each year (FAA Office of Aviation Policy, 2007). This summary predicts the number of enplanements for future years to come for commercial aviation airports, but currently the model is not applied to GA. To approximate this, historical relationships between airport passenger demand and/or activity measures, and local and national factors that influence aviation activity, are examined. The FAA also used regression analysis to reforecast the time series. Regression models including variables that characterize airports and their activities have been used to accurately forecast the number of operations at an airport. These data can aid in building terminal area forecast models for GA airports. Regression models of GA operations may also be used to develop quality control charts that aid in identifying unusual activities associated with these airports. By understanding the expected number of annual airport operations, outliers (which may indicate unusual behavior) can be detected, and further investigation may be pursued.

The FAA administers a GA survey each year to assure safe operation of all aircraft in the National Airspace System. To do this the FAA classifies GA aircraft according to seven different categories that include fixed wing piston, fixed wing turboprop, fixed wing turbojet, rotorcraft, other aircraft, experimental, and light-sport. The survey requests that aircraft owners provide the following information:

- Number of total hours flown in previous year
- Airframe hour reading and the most common place the aircraft was flown in survey year
- Hours flown by flight plan and flight conditions
- Type of landing gear and number of landings
- Fuel type and average fuel consumption
- Percentage of hours flown by person or company other than primary owner
- Avionics equipage

Due to adjustments to the GA survey and the way that it is administered, the response rate has been increasing for the past eight years. The col-
lection of these data would seem vital to understanding baseline GA operations. The information obtained by these surveys can be used to estimate a statistical model of annual number of operations at a GA airport where an operation is defined as a landing or a takeoff.

After a literature review it has been determined that little research has examined the development of statistical regression models to estimate GA activity. However, Hoekstra (2000), developed a methodology for estimating the annual number of GA operations at an airport and the annual number of GA operations per based aircraft at an airport (GRA, Inc., 2001). In July 2001, the GRA modified Hoekstra’s model to estimate more accurately the number of GA operations for non-towered airports based on data from towered airports. To do this many of the same independent variables were reused, and several were added. The variables used for the regression analysis appear in Table 1.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPS</td>
<td>Annual GA Operations at an airport (landings and takeoffs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Total Based Aircraft at an airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop100</td>
<td>1998 Population within 100 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACAORAK</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if state is CA, OR, WA, or AK, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA2</td>
<td>Total Based Aircraft at an airport squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN50MI</td>
<td>Percentage of based aircraft among based aircraft at GA airports within 50 mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop25/100</td>
<td>Ratio of Pop25 to Pop100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN100MI</td>
<td>Percentage of based aircraft among based aircraft at GA airports within 100 mi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR139</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if airport is certificated for commercial air carrier service, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>County population where airport is located in 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Se BA/BA</td>
<td>Single engine based aircraft/All based aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWDUM</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if airport is towered airport, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITFSNUM</td>
<td>Number of FAR141 certificated pilot schools at an airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Per Capita Income in the county in which the airport is located in 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Non-agricultural Employment in the airport’s county in 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSTAK</td>
<td>Categorical variable used in place of WACAORAK in Hoekstra’s model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WST</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if airport is located in FAA Western Region, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAL</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if airport is located in Alaska, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R12</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if airport is located in FAA New England Region or FAA Eastern Region, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITFS</td>
<td>Categorical variable, 1 if airport has FAR141 certified pilot school, 0 otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITFSEMP</td>
<td>Employees of FAR141 certificated pilot schools at an airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop50</td>
<td>1998 Population within 50 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop25</td>
<td>1998 Population within 25 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methods

Model Recreation

To understand relationships among airport characteristics and the annual number of airport operations better, attempts were made to recreate linear regression models previously constructed by GRA. An equation summary analysis is provided in Table 2. (Appendix A contains an equation matrix that describes each equation in terms of the independent variables included.) Each equation is described in Table 2 according to the following.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eq.</th>
<th>Dataset</th>
<th>Airports</th>
<th>Dummy?</th>
<th>Ind. Vars.</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>GRA $R^2$</th>
<th>Adj $R^2$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Towered</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Towered</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.640</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0.723</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>0.742</td>
<td>0.729</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Towered</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.717</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Towered</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0.727</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Non-towered</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Towered</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Non-towered</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Similar results were found for all regression models that used the towered data set. However, for models involving non-towered airports R-squared values are slightly yet inexplicably different from the ones estimated by GRA. Equation 13, which includes both the towered and non-towered data set, is GRA’s best model. The adjusted R-squared value for this model is 0.729, and the following is a mathematical representation of this regression model: \( \text{OPS} = 372.32 \times (BA) - 0.47 \times (BA^2) - 44,075.55 \times (IN100MI) - 46.65 \times (VITFSNUM) + 0.001 \times (Pop100) - 9149.68 \times (WACAORAK) + 26,602.72 \times (POP25/100) + 13,748.7 \times (TOWDUM) - 728. \\

**New Variable Creation**

To further improve the efficiency of our models, we revised those of GRA by creating and including some new variables. Instead of including a ratio of single engine aircraft to total based aircraft (Se BA/BA), a simpler single engine based aircraft (Se BA) variable was created. This variable was created using the data values from the total based aircraft and the ratio of single engine aircraft to total based aircraft (a redundant variable in the GRA analysis). Physical redundancy among variables may cause inter-correlation that makes it difficult to identify what is important to the response. Therefore, removing redundant variables and using more raw forms of data should make the model more efficient and practical.

A new regional variable was also created to describe the location of GA airports more efficiently. In the GRA models, four dummy variables are used to describe location. It was found, controlling for relevant independent variables, that significant differences between locations existed only where Alaska is involved. In other words, dummy variables that describe location in detail greater than Alaska versus not Alaska would not contribute to efficient statistical models of GA operations. Therefore, categories other than Alaska were collapsed. Next, a new regression model was created that included new variables AAL and SEBA. Also, the demographic variables PCI and EMP were added back to the model in order to determine if they contributed significantly to the model. These two variables were not included in any of the GRA models. (Equation 1 of Appendix B shows more details of this new regression model.)

**Introducing Second Order Terms**

Many of the \( p \)-values for this model were above 0.10; however disregarding their interaction with other variables would be unwise. On the other hand, a full second order model is not practical because it would leave the observation to variable ratio at less than two. In order to consider interaction in an efficient manner, we decided to use original continuous independent variables with a \( p \)-value greater than 0.10 for the regression model. The variables that satisfied this rule were VITFSNUM, VITFSEMP, IN50MI, IN100MI, Pop50, and Pop25. (Rather than include the newly introduced demographic variables PCI and EMP in the interaction terms we instead continued to arbitrarily control for them simply as main effects throughout the rest of the study.) Remember an explanation of these variables can be found in Table 1. We created fifteen new variables by taking the products between each of those named above. The variable FAR139 was also removed because it had a large \( p \)-value in the previous model and was not continuous. Next a regression model was estimated which included the fifteen additional variables that were created in order to assess interaction. The adjusted \( R^2 \) value improved from 0.7220 to 0.7753. (This equation is recognized as equation 2 in Appendix B.) The small \( p \)-values of many interaction terms justify their inclusion to the model.

**Results**

The next step in our analysis was to determine what variables contributed appreciably to the model and what variables might still be contributing to relatively inefficiency. Examination of \( p \)-value for each independent variable in the regression model revealed that VITFSEMP was the only variable remaining that was not statistically significant as a main effect, nor were any of the interaction terms including it. Therefore, the variable VITFSEMP and the second order variables that included VITF-
samples were removed from the model. This regression model is displayed as equation 3 in Appendix B. When the regression model was re-estimated without these variables, the adjusted $R^2$ value surprisingly decreased from 0.7753 to 0.7734. The dropped variables apparently contributed to the efficiency of the model in less than obvious ways, and they were retained to be included in the finally recommended regression model. A summary of the results from the final regression model as compared to that of GRA is presented in Table 3. The coefficient estimates and $p$-values of the variables used in our final model are displayed in Table 4. In other words, the expected value of OPS is a linear function of systematically chosen first and second order terms relevant to the response.

Table 3

*Final Model Comparison with GRA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># Of Airports</th>
<th># Of Independent Var.</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>$R^2_{adj}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRA’s Best Model (eq. 13)</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.7386</td>
<td>0.7292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black-Chimka Best Model</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.8036</td>
<td>0.7753</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

*Final Regression Variable’s Coefficients and P-Values*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>$P$-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOWDUM</td>
<td>13901.43</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>162.48</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP</td>
<td>-17.58</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAL</td>
<td>-17229.20</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITFSNUM</td>
<td>774.60</td>
<td>0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITFSEMP</td>
<td>285.41</td>
<td>0.618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN100MI</td>
<td>4083.09</td>
<td>0.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN50MI</td>
<td>33887.68</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop100</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop50</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pop25</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued
Next, face validity of the coefficients was considered in hopes to make some logical and physical sense of the model and to confirm there is no evidence of interpretation problems related to inter-dependence among independent variables. The regional variable AAL, which is a categorical variable that represents whether an airport is located in Alaska, has a large negative coefficient. This means that if an airport is located in Alaska, then it will most likely have a very small number of total annual operations. Perhaps this makes sense because Alaska is sparsely populated. Another variable named IN50MI, which represents the percentage of based aircraft among based aircraft at GA airports within 50 miles, has a large positive coefficient. This seems consistent if we should expect prominent airports (airports with high percentage of based aircraft at GA airports within 50 miles) to also have a large number of total annual operations. For another example the coefficient of the variable BA, for total based aircraft at an airport, has a large coefficient, which seems valid since one might expect an airport with a large fleet of total based aircraft to have a large number of annual operations.

## Conclusions and Future Considerations

The research conducted in this report has produced a more accurate and efficient model for estimating the annual number of operations at a GA airport. This information can be used to create better terminal area forecast summaries for GA airports, which could be a great benefit to civic planners. Comparison of predicted values with observed values goes toward validation of the regression model for GA airports of various
sizes. For example, for a small GA airport where the observed annual number of GA operations was 8071, the predicted number of operations is 8162. Additionally, for a medium sized airport where the observed number of operations was 37,216 and for a large sized airport where the observed number of operations was 85,050, the estimated number of annual operations is correspondingly 36,571 and 83,431.

One future objective of this project was to create quality control charts that could be used to monitor general aviation activity. We do this by analyzing the residuals from the regression model. Figure 1 demonstrates how quality control charts could be used to monitor GA behavior. The x-axis of this figure represents the estimated total annual number of operations for a given airport according to our model. The y-axis displays how far, in standard deviations, the actual values are in comparison to the predicted values estimated by the model. Airports with a large x-value and y-value might be of greatest concern because they represent highly unusual behavior at supposedly large airports. Airports located in the lower left hand corner might be of least concern because they represent usual behavior at supposedly small airports.

Another future objective of this project was to provide recommendations for multiple data stream integration applied to transportation security. Methods must be developed to improve monitoring across collaborative data sources and modes. Further improved information technology for GA could lead to even better recommendations for early detection decision aids for GA security. All of these activities would exist under with a common philosophy that if good models of usual activity fail to predict, then unusual activity may indicate a security threat. The model-based control of GA security described in this article may also be extended to other contexts such as highway, maritime transportation systems, mass transit, pipeline systems, and rail.

Figure 1. Model Errors versus Expectations
**References**


Abstract

The rapid expansion of the Chinese civil aviation industry has led to increasing numbers of Chinese students receiving flight training in western institutions. The growth of western flight training schools that service those students as well as the different cultural aspects of that population, including a preponderance of single child families, suggests a need to understand how learning styles of Chinese aviation students compare with their western counterparts. Researchers have evaluated several student populations to identify learning styles and thereby understand how training curricula might be adapted to engender a higher level of comprehension. In the present study, researchers administered the Kolb Learning Style Inventory (LSI) and a short biographical survey to 293 students enrolled in an aviation curriculum at a Chinese university. An analysis of the resulting data suggests that this population, over a four-year college curriculum, shifts from predominately assimilator and converger learning styles towards diverger and assimilator learning styles, implying a developed preference for reflective observation over abstract conceptualization. This finding is different from earlier studies of western aviation student populations that suggested assimilator and converger learning styles predominate across all year groups in a four-year aviation program, reflecting a preference for abstract conceptualization. These insights may be useful in the development of curricula for western flight training institutions that are tasked with the preparation of students from dissimilar cultures.
suggested that converger and assimilator styles, as identified by the Kolb learning style protocol, predominate in all college year groups, but that the percentage of those styles increases slightly throughout the college experience. It is unclear from earlier research whether that shift is driven by student adjustment to existing aviation training structures, reflects missing population data on students who departed the training cohort before program completion, or occurs due to some other factors. Studies of military and airline pilot groups by Kanske (1998/1999) suggest that a preponderance of converger learning styles is the normal state of the professional pilot population.

It should be noted that research questions of the present study do not focus on the cause of learning style shifts, but on what learning styles exist in a Chinese aviation program and whether Chinese aviation student learning style shifts do occur over a four-year collegiate aviation program.

An interesting consideration of this study is the unusual family structure in China. China is the only major country in the world to adopt a one child per family policy (which began in the 1970s). As a result, many students born in the 1980s and 1990s are the only child in their families. Hou, Zhang and Wang (2007) conducted a survey of Chinese students (seventh grade to ninth grade) to study their thinking and coping styles. Students were divided into two groups based on their dialectic (logical evaluation) thinking styles. The researchers found that among subjects with high dialectic thinking styles, students who were from single child families adopted more self-aware coping styles, compared with students who had siblings. And among students with low dialectic thinking styles, those who were an only child adopted less self-aware coping styles, compared with students who had siblings.

As exemplars of eastern and western cultures respectively, the culture of China is significantly different from that of the United States in terms of power distance, individualism, and long-term orientation, as measured by Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). When students from a particular cultural background are educated in a different cultural context, the impact of the cultural difference should be considered to identify any potentially negative influence. The purpose of the present research was designed to investigate the learning styles of Chinese aviation students and assess differences between that population and corresponding western aviation student populations.

Earlier studies have suggested there is a relationship between aviation students’ learning styles and the length of time in an aviation program. Research by Kanske and Brewster (2001), with a sample of American collegiate aviation students,
study found that students from the only child city group scored significantly higher on the Sensing-Intuition and Think-Feeling dimensions than the other two groups. In light of the preceding investigations, another research question of the present study is whether there is a relationship between learning styles and aviation students who are the only child of their families.

Method

Subjects

Subjects of the present study were students enrolled in the flight program of the Civil Aviation University of China (CAUC) during 2008, ranging from freshmen to seniors. Subjects included students who started the flight program as freshman at CAUC as well as students who had transferred into the flight program at CAUC from other degree programs or institutions. Students who enter the flight program at CAUC are required to complete general education courses and aviation ground courses during the first five semesters at the main campus. At the beginning of the sixth semester they are sent overseas, usually to Australia or the United States, to receive flight training and qualify for a commercial pilot license. For the eighth (final) semester, students return to CAUC to complete their bachelor’s degree program (Fanjoy & Gao, 2007).

Freshmen and sophomores participating in the present research enrolled in CAUC after high school graduation and successful completion of the National College Examination (Fanjoy & Gao, 2007). CAUC juniors who participated in the study were a mix of transfer students who had previously majored in engineering or science disciplines and continuing students who were preparing to depart for flight training abroad. Transfer students study aviation ground courses at CAUC for two semesters and then complete flight training at overseas locations. Seniors who participated in the present survey had completed flight training abroad and had just returned to CAUC for their final semester. Seniors included those who started the flight program as freshmen at CAUC as well as those who had transferred from other academic programs.

Data Collection

A survey instrument was administered that included demographic questions and questions from the Kolb Learning Style Inventory (LSI). Both survey sections were provided to respondents in a Chinese language format to minimize confusion associated with interpreting questions in an unfamiliar language. Questions in the demographic section of the survey focused on age, single child status, and year of admission to the flight program. Students, who were transfers from other programs or institutions, were asked to provide information about their previous enrollment. Seniors who had already completed overseas flight training were asked about aircraft types they had flown and flight hours accumulated. Experiential data was collected but not used in the present analysis.

The Kolb Learning Styles Inventory (LSI) was used to assess individual learning styles. The Kolb LSI is a popular survey instrument widely adopted by many researchers to address issues regarding learning styles of various populations. A critical reason for using this instrument in the current study is that similar studies in the domain of aviation were conducted with the Kolb LSI (Kanske, 2001; Kanske & Brewer, 2001; Kanske, Brewer, & Fanjoy, 2003). By using the same instrument, a comparison can be properly made to address research questions regarding the difference in learning styles of Chinese and American aviation students.

The LSI was translated into Mandarin with permission from the Hay Group who owns a copyright for the instrument. The translation was examined for wording errors and expression bias by US-based graduate students whose native language is Mandarin. Survey instruments were administered in a classroom setting to all students except seniors. A month later the instruments were administered in a dormitory setting to seniors who had just returned from overseas flight training. In both instances, students were informed in advance that survey completion was voluntary and they could refuse participation without penalty. Survey questionnaires were anonymously completed so that participating individuals could not be identified.
Data Analysis

A descriptive analysis was completed on biographical data collected from study participants. In addition, survey participants were asked to rank their preferred answers to LSI questions designed to determine the degree to which people are active or reflective observers when learning or solving problems as well as the degree to which they prefer to learn through direct concrete experience or abstract conceptualization. LSI survey data was analyzed with a rubric obtained from the Hay Group (Kolb & Kolb, 2005) that yielded a grid score on the Active Experimentation (AE) to Reflective Observation (RO) axis and a second grid score on the Concrete Experience (CE) to Abstract Conceptualization (AC) axis for each subject. The intersection of the two grid scores was used to identify the subject’s predominant learning style as accommodating, diverging, assimilating, or converging. Figure 1 depicts the Kolb LSI type grid used in the analysis. For example, if the LSI of a subject resulted in an AE-RO value of 2 and an AC-CE value of 3, then the associated learning style would be plotted in the first quadrant on the Kolb LSI type grid, which indicates a “diverging” learning style.

Figure 1. Learning Style Type Grid. (Kolb & Kolb, 2005)
Students with accommodating learning styles prefer to learn primarily through “hands-on” experience, to work with others, and to do field work. Students with diverging styles have broad cultural interests and prefer to work in groups, listening with an open mind to different points of view. Students with assimilating styles prefer readings, lectures, exploring analytical models, and having time to think things through. Students who adopt a converging style prefer to deal with technical tasks and problems rather than with social issues and interpersonal issues (Kolb & Kolb, 2005).

Results
Overall Description

Of the 399 survey questionnaires that were distributed and collected, 106 of them either had questions that were either left blank or inappropriately answered. Accordingly, those 106 data sets were not included in the following analysis. The overall response rate was 73.4%, and response rates from different year groups were: freshmen - 97.2%, sophomores - 73.8%, juniors - 96.3%, and seniors - 38.9%. The exceptionally high response rates for freshmen and juniors resulted because the instrument was administered in classes with required attendance. The low response rate for senior resulted because the instrument was administered in student dormitories.

Table 1
Learning Styles by Year Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Group</th>
<th>Accommodating</th>
<th>Assimilating</th>
<th>Converging</th>
<th>Diverging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
<td>19 (18%)</td>
<td>44 (42%)</td>
<td>30 (28%)</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophomores</td>
<td>22 (18%)</td>
<td>37 (30%)</td>
<td>20 (16%)</td>
<td>45 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juniors</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (31%)</td>
<td>7 (27%)</td>
<td>8 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors</td>
<td>5 (14%)</td>
<td>10 (27%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>19 (51%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All 293 students who participated in the survey with valid survey questionnaires were male. This was because only male students were enrolled in the flight program at CAUC when the surveys were completed. Among these 293 subjects, 195 students were the only child of their families. In terms of age, 52 students were between the 18 and 19, 184 students were between 20 and 21, 53 students were between 22 and 23, and four of them were older than 23 years when the survey was conducted.

Among the 293 subjects, 106 (36.2%) were freshmen, 124 (42.3%) were sophomores, 26 (8.9%) were juniors, and 37 (12.6%) were seniors. Stratified sampling was used in this study because students from the same year group had acquired a similar curricular experience at the target institution. Smaller numbers of surveys for the junior and senior year groups was caused by limited subject availability and incomplete survey instruments. As a result, generalization of results from those year groups is limited.

The scores for AC-CE and AE-RO were calculated for each subject using the LSI rubric, and then a corresponding learning style of each subject was determined using the LSI type grid. Of the 293 students in the sample, 85 were found to adopt the diverging style, 99 students were judged as assimilating, 49 were accommodating, and the remaining 60 students were viewed as converging. Table 1 depicts the learning styles employed by students in each year group.
accommodating or diverging learning style (preference for learning through concrete experience) with students who adopt an assimilating or a converging (preference for learning through abstract conceptualization) learning style may suggest a trend over the course of a four year aviation program. It can be seen from the data of the current research that the combined percentage of accommodating and diverging learning styles is higher in the seniors group of the sample, while the combined percentage of assimilating and converging is lower for the seniors group. If juniors are not included in the analysis due to the presence of many transfers from science or engineering programs, a trend of learning style change over the years in the aviation program becomes even more evident. See Table 3 for a comparison of combined learning styles.

A high percentage of seniors in the sample were found to adopt an accommodating or a diverging style. Seniors in this study had just completed

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Groups</th>
<th>Freshman</th>
<th>Sophomore</th>
<th>Junior</th>
<th>Senior</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC – CE</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>8.46</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD(AC – CE)</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>10.31</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>10.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE – RO</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD(AE – RO)</td>
<td>9.92</td>
<td>8.49</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>8.29</td>
<td>9.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Learning Styles Comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodating &amp; Diverging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilating &amp; Converging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
their training in the United States. These students worked individually with flight instructors, gained practical experience in an aircraft, and communicated with people from different cultures. The experience of western flight training may have had a significant influence on their learning styles.

By comparison, freshmen and sophomores had no flight experience when they completed the survey. The education they received was predominately theory related and in a lecture format. These students had limited opportunity to develop communication or social skills during their study in the aviation program. This may explain why a large percentage of freshmen and sophomores in the study sample adopted assimilating or converging learning styles.

The juniors group is similar to the freshmen group in that both groups scored higher on AC-CE than other groups, which suggests that juniors prefer learning through abstract conceptualization. Considering the fact that a large portion of junior students participating in this survey transferred from science or engineering programs and had no flying experience, the preference of abstract conceptualization suggests that juniors remained most comfortable with theoretical study, which is common in science and engineering education in China. And this is similar to the circumstance of the freshmen group.

A final analysis was conducted to identify the research question that addressed only-child influence on learning styles. Students were divided into two groups based on whether they were the only child of a family or not. Two tests were used to evaluate the significance of only-child status by comparing these two groups. Both tests used “only child or not” as an independent variable. In the first test, the dependent variable was AC-CE. The p-value for that test was 0.9086. The p-value for the second test, whose dependent variable was AE-RO, was 0.3150. Neither test result suggested a relationship between only-child status and scores for AE-RO and AC-CE. These results suggest that the effect of being an only child on learning style preference is not significant.

Conclusion

In this study of Chinese aviation students, a statistical analysis suggested that learning styles of freshmen were different from those of sophomores and seniors in the dimension of concrete experience to abstract conceptualization. That dimension reflects students’ preference between learning by experiencing and learning by thinking. Study findings suggest the freshman sample preferred abstract conceptualization, while sophomores and seniors preferred concrete experiencing. Although learning styles of freshmen in this sample were heavily weighted towards assimilators and convergers, by the second year in the program there appears to be a shift towards accommodating and diverging learning styles. Generalization of this result is very limited, and further investigation is warranted to see if such a shift can be explained by the nature of the flight program. Flight training traditionally emphasizes hands-on experience and implementation which may shape the learning environment as well as the learning styles that students employ.

The difference between mean learning styles of freshmen and seniors in the study was more dramatic than the difference between freshmen and sophomores. There was no significant difference between freshmen and junior mean learning styles. Senior student subjects had been in the flight program longer than the sophomores, and unlike the sophomores, the seniors had hands-on flight training experience. Many juniors in this study were students who had just transferred from other majors when the study was conducted. The impact of the aviation learning environment on their learning styles was not obvious because of their relatively short experience in the program.

An analysis of the entire sample and each year group in the sample suggests that the majority of Chinese aviation students tend to adopt diverging or assimilating learning styles that employ reflective observation (RO). The finding of reflective observation preference by the Chinese sample is different from findings in a study of western aviation students completed by Kanske, Brewster, and Fanjoy (2003). Table 4 compares means of AC-CE
and AE-RO between the Chinese student sample of the present study and American student sample as used by Kanske, Brewster, and Fanjoy (2003). That study suggested students from eight different aviation programs in the United States were more likely to use abstract conceptualization (AC) as a learning style. All year groups of the western student sample were dominated by assimilators and convergers. An earlier study by Kanske and Brewster (2001) of four different American academic aviation programs also found a tendency towards an abstract conceptualization learning style.

The difference between Chinese aviation students and their American counterparts might be explained by cultural differences and dissimilar lecturing/learning environments. Although it was noted that many students in this study came from single child families, the analysis did not suggest that circumstance had any impact on adopted learning styles. Further study is needed to determine the exact causes of the learning style difference. However, findings of the present study are useful to researchers and educators who are interested in Chinese aviation education, and may provide insights to the learning styles of Chinese aviation students. Western training providers may be able to use the findings of this study to align their syllabi and teaching philosophies to better suit the characteristics of this aviation student population.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Group</th>
<th>Freshmen</th>
<th>Sophomores</th>
<th>Juniors</th>
<th>Seniors</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>CHN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC-CE</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>8.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>AE-RO</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Abstract

This study sought to evaluate the statistical power of aviation research published in four prominent peer-reviewed journals (Collegiate Aviation Review, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research, and International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies). Further, this study investigated whether power was mentioned or calculated as well as if articles included details on effect size(s). The study yielded 128 articles that included statistical testing and provided enough information to calculate power. From these articles a total of 1,692 statistical tests were analyzed. The average power of these tests was .277 considering a small effect size, .685 when considering a medium effect size, and .874 when assuming a large effect size. Considering that a medium effect size is generally utilized when there is no research-based reason to use an alternative level and that the accepted minimum power value is .80, aviation research appears to be underpowered. Also, only 5.6% of articles conducted an a priori power analysis whilst 11.9% mentioned power. Among studies that included statistical testing, only 4.2% calculated effect size. Thus aviation research commonly fails to provide critical research data. Guidance on ways researchers can improve power and/or reduce sample size requirements are provided. Suggestions for future research and policies are also provided.
the appropriateness and utility of NHST. Fagley (1985) noted that if researchers were to ardently adhere to a veritable definition of the null hypothesis, it would always be determined to be false. Kline (2004) also noted that there are many fallacies within the literature about p values being equated to effect sizes and the false assumptions that if the null hypothesis is not rejected then it has to be true. Also, Kline (2004) displayed concern that only when the null-hypothesis is rejected are the findings considered of value to the research community.

Fisher (1966) disagreed with an a priori determination of a significance level (α), instead advocating the use of a sliding scale of significance proportionate to the p-value resultant from the conducted research. Cohen (1992) found that in most studies involving statistical tests, “the chance of obtaining a significant result was about that of tossing a head with a fair coin” (p. 155). Along the same lines, Ferrin et al. (2007) remarked that “unfortunately, knowing the p-value reveals nothing about either the magnitude of the effect or about the width of the interval on the distribution line (confidence interval), or about power; nor does it provide information about the practical or clinical significance of the finding” (pp. 87-88). It is not uncommon that details such as effect sizes, which are arguably just as important as p-values, if not more so, are regularly missing from research findings (Osborne, 2008).

Another problem that has been noted concerning archetypical significance testing is its focus on avoiding a Type I error, i.e. the rejection of a null hypothesis when in fact it is true (Cohen, 1962; Stevens, 2007). This concentration on the probability of performing a Type I error (α) often leads to the neglect of Type II (β) error avoidance. This oversight may lead to researchers having an undesirable chance of accepting a null hypothesis that is instead actually false. Simply, the probability of a study successfully detecting a difference among groups in order to reject a null hypothesis, known as power, is often very low. What is especially problematic about the prevalence of studies with low power is that these blunders can be easily avoided by conducting a power analysis during the research design process. Further, the findings of research can be scrutinized in terms of the actual power, i.e. studies that report “insignificant” findings but are determined to have low power should be viewed with skepticism (Ferrin et al., 2007).

Cohen (1962) first reported his concerns that “the problem of power is occasionally approached indirectly” and studies overwhelmingly pay “careful attention to issues of significance, and typically no attention to power” (p. 145). Kosciulek and Szymanski (1993) recognized similar deficiencies in research noting that “statistical power analysis is a desirable and necessary ingredient in planning and conducting effective research. Unfortunately, however, it is an underused tool in […] research” (p. 212). Over the last 50 years, there has been little improvement in the inclusion of power analysis in research. Investigations into studies conducted in areas such as psychology, medicine, behavioral accounting, business, and education found a large percentage had low power values or neglected power entirely (Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005; Borkowski, Welsh, & Zhang, 2001; Ferrin et al., 2007; Jones & Sommerlund, 2007; Osborne, 2008). The absence of power testing raised concerns at the American Psychological Association (APA) which convened a Task Force on Statistical Inference which defined “guidelines indicative of good research” which included “the reporting of effect size estimates and confidence intervals for any effect size involving principal outcomes as well as consideration of statistical power and sample size in the design of studies” (Ferrin et al., 2007, p 88). The Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.) clearly notes that researchers should “provide evidence the study has sufficient power to detect effects of substantial interest” (APA, 2010, p. 30).

In light of the practical and statistical importance of power analysis, it is critical that research inquiries include such data. Several studies have been conducted in a variety of subject areas in efforts to determine the level of inclusion of power analysis to help shed light on the general quality of research and statistical analysis that exists in

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a body of research. As aviation research has continued to expand and become more mainstream, it becomes ever more critical that it comply with general research standards, but what is even more essential is that the research being published provides meaningful and well-founded findings determined by competent research and analysis methods. Therefore this study analyzed the statistical power of quantitative aviation research studies found within four prominent aviation-related peer-reviewed academic journals – the Collegiate Aviation Review, the Journal of Air Transportation World Wide, the Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research, and the International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies. Two related publications, the Journal of Aviation Management and Education and the International Journal of Professional Aviation Training Testing Research, were omitted as these journals had a very limited quantity of articles to analyze.

**Statistical Power**

The power of a statistical test is defined as “the probability, given that \( H_0 \) is false, of obtaining sample results that will lead to the rejection of \( H_0 \)” (Coladarci, Cobb, Minium, & Clarke, 2008, p. 403). More simply, power refers to the chance of a statistical test to detect a difference between or among groups being analyzed. Discussions about power normally mention the Type II error (\( \beta \)), which is the “probability of retaining the null hypothesis when it is false” (Coladarci, Cobb, Minium, & Clarke, 2008, p. 404) therefore power can be determined by the formula \( 1 - \beta \). The resultant number can be viewed as the percent chance that the statistical test will be able to rightfully reject a false null hypothesis, e.g. a power of 0.33 means that the test has a 33% chance of succeeding to reject a false null hypothesis. Obviously, a study that only has a 33% chance at success is not very viable nor would one want to take findings of a study with such a level of power too seriously (Cohen, 1992; Ferrin et al., 2007).

**Determinants of Statistical Power**

Statistical power is most easily defined by the formula \( 1 - \beta \), however, there are several additional factors that are involved in the calculation of power. There are five determinants of power: significance level, homogeneity of samples, sample size, effect size, and directionality. The significance level, or alpha (\( \alpha \)), is the probability of rejecting a true null hypothesis (Type I error). This is commonly set at 0.05 meaning there is a 5% chance of committing a Type I error. Some studies go as far as using a higher \( \alpha \) standard such as 0.01. Yet it is important to recognize the relationship between \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \). When a researcher demands a more stringent \( \alpha \), they simultaneously allow for a larger chance of committing a Type II error (\( \beta \)) (Stevens, 2007). Therefore Cohen (1988) suggested weighing the importance of \( \alpha \) versus \( \beta \) during the research design process vis-à-vis arbitrarily setting \( \alpha = 0.05 \). The recommended procedure is to divide \( \beta \) by \( \alpha \) to determine a ratio that ideally does not exceed 4 : 1. For example, if \( \alpha = 0.05 \) and \( \beta = 0.20 \), the resultant ratio would be 4 : 1. The power in this case would of course be 0.80 (1 – 0.20), i.e. there would be an 80% chance that the study would be able to correctly identify a difference among investigated groups. In sum, as \( \alpha \) is strengthened, power is reduced, therefore it is no surprise that Stevens (2007) stated that “it is not always wise to set \( \alpha \) as low as 0.05 or 0.01.” (p. 105). Refer to Figures 1 and 2 (page 70) for a comparison of power when \( \alpha = 0.05 \) versus \( \alpha = 0.01 \).

Another factor in determining the power of a statistical test is the reliability or homogeneity of samples which can be observed through the standard error of a statistic (\( SE_{\bar{x}} \)) which is defined by a relationship between the population variance estimate (\( s^2 \)) and the sample size (\( n \)) (Cohen, 1988):

\[
SE_{\bar{x}} = \sqrt{s^2/n}
\]

As is obvious with a constant sample size, a reduction in variance nets a lower standard error. The standard error of tests utilizing dependent samples is lower than if independent samples are utilized. This is due to the fact that “the standard error of the difference between means is modified to take
Figure 1. Comparison of Power \((1 - \beta)\) between \(\alpha = 0.05\) (top) and \(\alpha = 0.01\) (bottom). Created in \(G^*\text{Power}\). Note: Power is indicated by the un-shaded region underneath the dashed curve.

Figure 2. Comparison of Power \((1 - \beta)\) between a \(t\)-test utilizing independent samples (top) and dependent samples (bottom). Created in \(G^*\text{Power}\). Note: Power is indicated by the un-shaded region underneath the dashed curve.
Figure 3. Comparison of Power \((1 - \beta)\) between \(n = 30\) (top) and \(n = 60\) (bottom). Created in G*Power. Note: Power is indicated by the un-shaded region underneath the dashed curve.

Figure 4. Plot of Power vs. Sample Size for an Independent Means t-test. Created in G*Power.
Another manipulator of power is effect size which Stevens (2007) defines as “how much of a difference the treatments make, or the extent to which the groups differ in the population on the dependent variable” (p. 106). Alternatively, Cohen (1988) defines effect size “as an index of degree of departure from the null hypothesis” (p. 10). Mathematically, effect size (δ) is calculated by dividing the difference between the means of investigated populations divided by the population standard deviation and is represented by the formula (Coladarci, Cobb, Minium, & Clarke, 2007):

\[
\delta = \frac{(\mu_1 - \mu_2)}{\sigma}
\]

When all other factors remain constant, as effect size increases power also increases (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Comparison of Power (1 – β) between small d (top) and large d (bottom). Created in G*Power. Note: Power is indicated by the un-shaded region underneath the dashed curve.
This is due to the fact that the presence of a larger difference among groups would, in theory, be easier to detect (Cohen, 1988). The problem resides in the fact that “effect size is rarely known in advance” (Borkowski, Welsh, and Zhang, 2001). To assist in the selection of an effect size to use in power analysis, three general categories have been adopted: small, medium, and large. Cohen (1988) stated that:

‘s’ effect sizes must not be so small that seeking them amidst the inevitable operation of measurement and experimental bias and lack of higher likelihood be a bootless task […] and] large effects must not be defined so large that their quest by statistical methods is wholly a labor of supererogation (p. 13).

In most cases, it is logical to select “medium” effect so as to avoid one extreme or another. As Cohen (1988) described, medium effects would be perceptible to the naked eye. But because certain statistical test yield different levels of accuracy, individual tests have different δ values equating to designations of small, medium, and large. Effect sizes for common statistical tests are given in Table 1.

An example of the influence of effect size is if a t-test is performed with independent means, α = 0.05 and n = 100 in each group (note that effect size in t-tests is referred to as “d”) (Cohen, 1992). If the researcher used a small d (0.20), the resultant power is 0.29. In contrast, if the recommended medium d (0.50) were used, the resultant power would be 0.94. When performing statistical analysis, researchers can select a one or two-tailed measure. If the researcher proposes a one-tailed measure and correctly identifies the directionality of the hypothesis, the critical area will be larger thus there is a higher likelihood that the null hypothesis will be rejected. As such, when all other factors remain constant, a one-tailed test will have a greater power than a two-tailed version (see Figure 6, page 74) (Coladarci, Cobb, Minimum, & Clarke, 2007). This advantage only exists, however, if the researcher surmises the correct direction (Cohen, 1988). The difference in power between a one-tailed and a two-tailed t-test of independent means (α = 0.05, n = 50 in each group, and d = 0.50) is 0.79 and 0.69 respectively.

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Type</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. t-test (independent means)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. t-test (product-moment correlation)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Difference between two r values</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Test vs. population proportion (P) = 0.50</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chi square – goodness of fit</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. One way ANOVA</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Multiple correlation</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kosciulek and Szymanski (1993) outlined a pre-test power analysis plan that should be utilized by researchers during their methodology design process. The first step is to evaluate the literature to determine a reasonable effect size that can be expected when dealing with the subject at hand and the proposed experimental design. Next, the researcher should select an appropriate statistical test. With this information, the researcher can use power tables or statistical analysis software to determine the required sample size. The researcher can then estimate the power of the study. If the power is determined to be at or above 0.80, then the researcher can confidently move forward. If the power is below the desired level, the researcher can re-evaluate the sample size, alpha level, the proposed statistical test, or other aspects of the methodology for possible revision (Borkowski, Welsh, & Zhang, 2001; Kosciulek & Szymanski, 1993).

Uses of Power: Incorporating Power into Research Design and Evaluation

There are two primary instances when statistical power analysis can be used in research – *a priori* and *a posteriori*. Ideally, researchers conduct a power analysis before partaking in their study so as to insure a reasonable chance of correctly rejecting a null hypothesis (Osborne, 2008). Cohen (1992) stated that a power of 0.80 or greater is acceptable. It is logical to perform this important step in research design because if a researcher determines that the power of the proposed study falls below 0.80, an amendment is in order to correct the deficiency. A common *a priori* use of power is the determination of sample size. Clearly researchers should determine the minimum number of participants in a particular study in order to have adequate power. At the same time, it may be advantageous to determine that fewer individuals are necessary to sufficiently undertake a study with a minimum power of 0.80 potentially saving the researcher time, money, and effort (Osborne, 2008).

Kosciulek and Szymanski (1993) outlined a pre-test power analysis plan that should be utilized by researchers during their methodology design process. The first step is to evaluate the literature to determine a reasonable effect size that can be expected when dealing with the subject at hand and the proposed experimental design. Next, the researcher should select an appropriate statistical test. With this information, the researcher can use power tables or statistical analysis software to determine the required sample size. The researcher can then estimate the power of the study. If the power is determined to be at or above 0.80, then the researcher can confidently move forward. If the power is below the desired level, the researcher can re-evaluate the sample size, alpha level, the proposed statistical test, or other aspects of the methodology for possible revision (Borkowski, Welsh, & Zhang, 2001; Kosciulek & Szymanski, 1993).
It is important to note that if a study uncovers statistically significant findings, either the study must have had sufficient power or a Type I error occurred. While this is true, it is important to consider that if the researcher in this case did not conduct an *a priori* power analysis, they were essentially blindly seeking results without any idea how likely they may be to find it, which is clearly an attribute of poorly designed research. Also, the consideration and inclusion of essential aspects related to power, such as effect size, are still critical to the presentation and analysis of findings (Cohen 1992; Kline, 2004; Osborne, 2008).

*A posteriori* approaches to power allow for more of an evaluation of the quality of research findings by peers. If a *post hoc* power analysis reveals low power in a study in which the null hypothesis was not rejected, “it is unclear whether a Type II error has occurred” (Osborne, 2008, p. 153). Equally, if a study that fails to reject the null hypothesis is revealed to have power of 0.80 or greater, readers can have a confidence that the study came to right conclusion (Osborne, 2008).

**Previous Studies on Power Analysis in Research**

Because of the crucial importance of adequate power among studies, there has been an assortment of research that has analyzed literature in an array of fields. The seminal study of power in research literature was conducted by Cohen (1962) in which 78 articles in Volume 61 of the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* were examined. Eight articles were found to be missing statistical testing and were omitted. Cohen (1962) then calculated power for each of the remaining articles. When considering small effect sizes, the mean calculated power among the studies was 0.18. “When one posits medium effects in the population (generally of the order of twice as large as small effects) the studies average[d] slightly less than a 50-50 chance of successfully rejecting their major null hypothesis” (Cohen, 1962, p. 150). When calculated assuming a large effect, the mean power rose to 0.83. Considering that “in the absence of any basis for specifying an alternative to the null hypothesis for purpose of power analysis, the criterion values for a medium effect are […] convention” (Cohen, 1962, p. 153) and the minimum power deemed acceptable by Cohen (1962; 1988; 1992) is 0.80, the reviewed research fell well short of the desirable power levels.

Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989), using the work of Cohen (1962; 1988) as a model, investigated the power of a much broader range of journals in subject areas including psychology, education, communication, sociology, forensics, speech and hearing, communications, journalism, and marketing. When viewed with the assumption of a small effect size, only one journal had a mean power above 0.50. With a medium effect, two journals mean powers above 0.80 with more than half concentrated around the 0.50 mark. Even when considering large effects, five groups of journals did not meet the recommended power threshold of 0.80. Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) also analyzed 56 articles for their inclusion of power and discussions of why significance levels and sample sizes were selected. Only two mentioned power and in only four articles “alpha was mentioned, either by saying that it was set at a certain level (0.05) before the experiment or by referring to the danger of alpha inflation” (p. 311). No articles were found to include reasoning behind why a particular alpha levels or sample sizes were utilized.

Kosciulek and Szymanski (1993) examined 150 rehabilitation counseling studies containing 32 statistical tests. Within this literature, it was discovered that:

100% of the studies did not have a 50-50 chance of detecting small effect sizes. Furthermore, only 12 had a 1 in 2 chance of finding significant results assuming medium effects. A comparatively small 9% of the studies showed less than a 50-50 chance of detecting large effects, and a miniscule 3% showed less than 3 in 10 chances (p. 212).

A study of accounting related literature was conducted by Borkowski, Welsh, and Zhang (2001) and included articles from three journals over a period between 1993 and 1997. In total, 258 articles with over 14,000 statistical tests within them
were analyzed. The average power among all journals over the five year period evaluated was 0.23 considering a small effect size, 0.71 when using a medium effect size, and 0.93 for large effect size.

Bezeau and Graves (2001) found slightly more encouraging results through a scrutiny of 66 clinical neuropsychology studies among three journals between 1998 and 1999. It was found that the mean power for studies assuming a 0.50 effect size to be 0.50, with those at the 0.80 effect size power was 0.768, and for those with an effect size of 1.35, the mean power was 0.957. Yet this study identified general deficiencies in statistical methods that were used noting that “few studies appear[ed] to conduct a priori power analyses; only 3% of the reviewed studies reported such an analysis […] and] only 9% of the reviewed […] studies explicitly reported the effect size of their results” (Bezeau & Graves, 2001, p. 403).

The plethora of research supporting the calculation of power prompted Osborne (2008) to attempt to identify if the inclusion of such statistical analysis has improved over time. The power values discovered by Cohen (1962) were compared to 96 educational psychology journal articles from 1998-1999. The findings indicated “significant but modest differences in observed power” (Osborne, 2008, p. 156) however a majority of articles still failed to surpass the desirable 0.80 power level. Among the more recent articles, the mean power assuming a small effect was 0.27, with a medium effect it was 0.71, and with a large effect it was 0.89. Only 2% of articles in the study discussed power and only 16.7% reported effect size.

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal Name</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collegiate Aviation Review</td>
<td>1985 – Spring 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research</td>
<td>1990 – 2003a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and large effect sizes as outlined by Cohen (1988; 1992) with the value of effect size being tailored for each specific type of statistical test that was conducted. Unless an article specifically noted that a one tailed test was conducted, power analyses were calculated assuming a two tailed test.

An example of the calculation process follows. Assume a study utilized a two tailed $t$-test to analyze the difference between two independent means. Within this study, the researcher selected an alpha level of 0.05 and had two independent samples both of which included 30 individuals. Using the guidance of Cohen (1992), power for the effect sizes of small (0.20), medium (0.50), and large (0.80) can each be evaluated. For a small effect size, power would be 0.118 and for a medium effect size, power would be 0.477. As a medium effect size is generally considered a reasonable level, this study would have poor power. In fact, there is less than a 50% chance that the study will correctly identify a difference between means if it exists. Only a study assuming a large effect size would have adequate power, in this case it would be 0.861.

Articles were also analyzed to determine if the authors had conducted an a priori power analysis. Further, each article was evaluated to establish whether or not power was mentioned or considered. Lastly, articles were assessed for the presence of effect size calculations. These three details were uncovered through a thorough reading of the article. Further, if the article came in Adobe PDF, Microsoft Word, or other searchable text document, the keywords “power” and “effect size” were used to serve as a confirmation that the appropriate measures were detected.

**Results**

The *Collegiate Aviation Review (CAR)* included 155 articles with 41 containing statistical analysis. As the data were analyzed, it was discovered that there were several articles that failed to provide enough detail to conduct a power analysis. Among the CAR articles with statistical tests, 6 (14.6% of articles having statistical tests) omitted key details resulting in 35 articles that allowed for power analyses. A total of 580 statistical tests were conducted within these studies with an average of 16.5 tests per article. Within the issues of the *Journal of Air Transportation World Wide (JATW)*, there were 104 articles of which 29 included statistical tests. In the JATW there were 4 (13.7%) articles in which power analyses were not possible leaving at total of 25 articles that could be utilized. In these remaining articles there were 463 tests with an average of 18.5 tests per article. The *Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research (JAAER)* contained 40 articles of which 7 included statistical testing. However, 1 (14.2%) article lacked sufficient data to calculate power, thus 6 articles were able to be analyzed leaving 29 overall statistical tests resulting in an average of 4.8 tests per article. The *International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies (IJAAS)* included 160 studies with 65 containing statistical data. Three (4.6%) articles in the IJAAS had inadequate data to examine power leaving 62 articles to be studied. Within these articles, there were 620 tests conducted with an average of 10.0 tests per article. Across the 4 journals included in this study, the total number of articles that included the necessary information to conduct power analyses was 128. Within these articles there were 1,692 statistical tests conducted (see Table 3).

Each article identified to have statistical tests within it was examined so as to extract the necessary information to calculate power. Next, power analyses were conducted at the small, medium, and large effect sizes for each identified statistical test. In all but a few limited cases, G*Power 3.1 was sufficient to calculate power. In the instances that G*Power was lacking an applicable calculation, PASS 2008 was utilized. In the limited number of cases in which neither software package offered a solution (e.g. for MANCOVA), per the recommendations of Cohen (1962) and Dattalo (2008), substitutions were made for tests that were calculable by available software. Such substitutions have the tendency to slightly overrate the power (Cohen, 1962). For each individual publication, all of the power analyses for each statistical test were averaged for the small, medium, and large
Table 3.
Summary of Articles and Statistical Tests Included in this Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal Name</th>
<th># Articles (%)</th>
<th># Stat. Tests (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collegiate Aviation Review</td>
<td>35 (27.3)</td>
<td>580 (34.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Air Transportation World Wide</td>
<td>25 (19.5)</td>
<td>463 (27.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research</td>
<td>6 (4.7)</td>
<td>29 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies</td>
<td>62 (48.5)</td>
<td>620 (36.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Averages (All Journals)</td>
<td>128 (100)</td>
<td>1,692 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.
Summary of Power Analyses per Each Level of Effect Size for Each Journal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal Name</th>
<th>Small ES</th>
<th>Medium ES</th>
<th>Large ES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collegiate Aviation Review</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Air Transportation World Wide</td>
<td>.428</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.410</td>
<td>.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.614</td>
<td>.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Averages (All Journals)</td>
<td>.277</td>
<td>.685</td>
<td>.874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.
Percent of Articles Including A Priori Power Analysis, Mention of Power, and Mention of Effect Size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal Name</th>
<th>A Priori</th>
<th>Power Mentioned</th>
<th>ES Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collegiate Aviation Review</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Air Transportation World Wide</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education and Research</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average % (All Journals)</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
effect sizes. The results of these analyses are aggregated in Table 4.

Articles where then examined for the calculation of an *a priori* power analysis. Among the 41 articles in the CAR only 1 (0.6%) included such an analysis. Of the 29 JATW articles with statistical tests, none reported a power analysis. One (2.5%) of the 7 articles in the JAAER contained a power analysis while such was present in 6 (9.5%) out of 65 articles in the IJAAS. Upon assessing the articles for the inclusion of any type of discussion of statistical power it was found that 2 (1.3%) of CAR articles, zero of JATW articles, 1 (2.5%) of JAAER articles, and 14 (22.2%) of IJAAS articles mentioned power. Effect size was mentioned in 1 (0.6%) of CAR articles. Within the JATW, 1 (3.4%) article discussed effect size. The JAAER also had 1 (2.5%) article referencing effect size. Lastly, remarks about effect size were included in 3 (4.8%) IJAAS articles. A summary of these results is presented in Table 5.

**Discussion**

It is readily apparent that aviation research studies are often underpowered and neglect to provide critical components necessary to confirm the soundness of such studies. If one considers a small effect size, there was only a slightly better than a 1 in 4 chance of detecting a difference. Considering a medium effect size, the average power was .685 which is still short of the generally acceptable .80 value. Only if considering a large effect size, which it is important to note is “roughly twice as large as medium” (Cohen, 1962, p. 150), would researchers exceed the .80 threshold. What is more problematic is that so few studies actually considered power and among the studies that did mention power, the calculation thereof was rarely conducted. The neglect of effect size makes it more difficult for the research community to garner the true significance of a study by the lack of appropriately framing findings.

Some other related issues also arose during this research. Fourteen (9.8%) of the 142 articles that included statistical tests failed to provide enough information to conduct a *post hoc* power analysis. This was generally due to incomplete or missing sample data or omitted details concerning a statistical test (e.g. numbers of groups or degrees of freedom). Several articles did not cite the results of statistical tests in APA or any other recognizable format. Three articles stated that a particular statistical test was done and that the results were either significant or not, but no further details were provided such as the actual test statistic and associated elements. One article stated that statistical testing was done, but no specific test was mentioned. Further the article went on to state the findings were significant but yielded no additional information. Two studies claimed abnormally large effect sizes which naturally boosted the power of the study even in light of the use of small sample sizes. These studies cited that such effect sizes were chosen based on the findings of previous research. However, upon closer examination, the sample membership was dissimilar to the individuals studied in the cited research, therefore making the choice of effect size somewhat questionable.

These findings are problematic for several reasons. Much of the research examined in this study was underpowered when considering a medium effect size. This means that the studies had a less than acceptable likelihood of identifying a difference or effect if one was actually present. As aviation is such a safety sensitive industry, it is critical that related research be able to adequately identify what is sought and that key findings are not missed from poorly designed or conducted research. What is more troubling is that the studies in the examined journals are probably the highest powered studies conducted in these subject areas as Cohen (1962) noted “if anything, published studies are more powerful than those which do not reach publication, certainly not less powerful” (p. 152). Thus there is probably more research that is being conducted within the industry that has even lower power.

The infrequent inclusion of vital components such as power, fundamental to the establishment of an adequate sample size, effect size, and sound
for reviewers to be able to confidently assess whether a study has adequate power, the parameters required to conduct a power analysis must be included […] The failure to report these parameters causes two problems: (a) the reviewers cannot replicate the analysis and (b) the reviewers cannot judge the appropriateness of the parameters used in the analysis. (p. 230)

Again this disserves the aviation industry. While the lack of the mention of power analysis does not guarantee that it was not appropriately assessed, its omission leaves readers to wonder if the researcher did in fact consider it. The merit of research is directly related to the ability to reconstruct a particular study. Missing information calls the dependability of such research into question. Moreover, in order for the aviation industry to make improvements and gains in understanding, stakeholders need to be provided with sound, well-conceived research.

It is clear that aviation research is often underpowered and frequently underreports effect size and power however this should be kept in perspective. The performance of aviation research should be compared to other subject areas in recent research. The Borkowski, Welsh, and Zhang (2001) study of over 14,000 accounting articles yielded an average power of 0.71 with medium effect size. Osborne (2008) similarly found that educational psychology articles in 96 journals had the same average power, 0.71, at the medium effect size. Recall that the average power calculated in this study was .685 which is closely comparable. Bezeau and Graves (2001) found that 3% of neuropsychology articles that were examined mentioned power and 9% calculated effect size. Osborne (2008) discovered that 2% of educational psychology articles in the study mentioned power while 16.7% reported effect size. This study found that aviation research mentioned power in 11.9% of articles and effect size was calculated in 4.2% of cases. So in the case of power, aviation research is at least performing better in recognizing this important aspect of statistical analysis, yet aviation research is apparently lagging in the reporting of effect sizes.

The question that remains is what can be done to improve future aviation research? Considering that most studies tend to use $\alpha = 0.05$ and, assuming a medium effect size (as many studies do not have a known or defined effect size), the problem appears to lie with sample size. As Cohen (1962) noted “if we then accept the diagnosis of general weakness of the studies, what treatment can be prescribed? Formally, at least, the answer is simple: increase sample sizes” (p. 151). Of course, there will be times when sample sizes are limited due to a variety of constraints, for example fiscal or practical limits. It is not uncommon for aviation program populations to be so small that extracting ample numbers for samples, particularly if multiple groups are required, is not possible.

Considering that small sample sizes are common in aviation research, lamenting the need to increase sample size is not practical and provides no solutions to aviation researchers. Instead, researchers need a toolbox to access during their research design process in order to maximize power even if it does not reach the minimums advocated in the literature.

One method to increase power is to accept a larger alpha level. In studies that do not have immediate safety or large financial implications, a higher tolerance for Type I errors could be accepted. Thus diversions from what is generally considered “the norm” may be viable options in certain situations. Leahey (2005) rigorously argued that blindly selecting the .05 significance level is problematic and the individual research setting should be considered when selecting alpha levels. There are instances when it is certainly reasonable to use a “non-standard” alpha of .10. According to the University of New England (2000), there are even cases where an alpha of .20 may be reasonable. Regardless of the choice of alpha, “at a minimum, the reporting of $\beta$ would [help to] complement and interpret the true value of a reported $\alpha$ in any given study” (Cohen, 1962, p. 82). As is true with any well conducted study, all decisions in research design such as determining sample size, $\alpha$, and $\beta$
levels should be backed with ample and appropriate citation support.

Another potential way to manage power and sample size is to further investigate or reconsider the effect size that is expected. Whilst it is often not possible to know what the effect size is going to be, it is worth digging into existing literature to see if anything similar has been done in the area of interest. If a larger effect size can be used in the power calculation, a smaller sample size or lower power would be required.

Researchers can also consider the use of a one-tailed test in lieu of a two-tailed test. Again, this choice should be supported by evidence in the literature or if a critical component of the proposed inquiry. If a researcher can justify that there is an inclination for a directional hypothesis, e.g. looking for an increase rather than simply a difference between groups, then they can gain power or take the advantage of lowering the required sample size.

Another way that researchers can reduce their sample size burden or boost power is to design the study using dependent samples. Because of the lower variance between these groups, researchers gain the aforementioned benefits. Clearly, not all studies lend themselves to be changed to this design, but it is worthy of consideration when pressed for power or sample size.

Researchers should be aware that different formulas are used in the calculation of power for each type of statistical test, therefore there is some variance in the power demands among individual tests. Complex statistical analysis requires a larger sample size or, alternatively, lowers power. For example, a smaller sample is required when running a t-test versus an ANOVA with multiple groups. Although complex designs should not be abandoned if the research necessitates it, this certainly should be part of the consideration to insure the highest probability of success with the goals of the research.

One more way to improve power or lower sample size needs is to use parametric analyses instead of nonparametric types. While the differences between the two types of analysis are marginal when sample sizes are large, there are noticeable differences when dealing with small samples. Since generally the problem is the sample size is too small, parametric analyses should be chosen if possible. Such advice does come with the caveat that small samples often do not fit the assumptions of parametric tests, so caution is necessary to insure that the attributes of the sample are examined for compliance with such assumptions.

It is important to note that even if an a priori power analysis comes up short of the recommended .80, that in itself is not a reason to abandon the research project. If the value is still lower than the .80 or other value selected by the researcher after every effort has been made to improve power, the research can still move forward with the research but should note the power issue as a potential significant limitation. Also, if the null-hypothesis ends up being retained, the researcher would need to explain that this could be attributed to the study being underpowered. Researchers should still feel confident in submitting such studies for publication because much can be learned from the design, implementation, sampling, analysis, and findings, or lack thereof. And since there still is a limited amount of aviation literature available to the research community, such studies can be enlightening on how to design and conduct future studies as well as identifying areas that call for additional investigation. See appendix A for a checklist on ways to improve power or reduce sample size.

The findings here can also assist individuals other than researchers. The evidence presented here should serve as an encouragement to journal editors and reviewers to pursue the recommendations of the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference by requiring the inclusion of evidence of power analysis and effect sizes in submissions. A wide range of journals now require such data in all submissions (Ferrin et al., 2007). This movement could help standardize the reporting of research making it easier for interpretation and evaluation results. This should help align aviation research with mainstream research. Perhaps the most positive effect would be that “with an understanding of effect size estimates and confidence intervals, […]

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researchers can go beyond the reporting of statistical significance (p-value) and report on practical significance” (Ferrin et al., 2007, p. 99) thus findings within aviation studies would be able to have enhanced meaning and applicability by allowing stakeholders to go beyond the typical dichotomous findings of hypothesis testing to find deeper, more pragmatic utility of results and conclusions. Editors and reviewers could use the findings and recommendations in this study to analyze the appropriateness of methods used by researchers. Even if a study is found to be underpowered, reviewers and editors should determine if the researcher recognized this limitation and made efforts to mitigate its effects on the study. As long as any limitations are properly recognized, the article should still receive consideration for publication keeping in mind the potential utility of the study in expanding the research literature even if the study is underpowered.

In sum, the aviation research studied here appears to fall short of minimum desirable statistical power levels. This body of research infrequently discussed or calculated power and commonly neglected to present effect sizes. These facts call into question the sample size strategies used in these studies. Further, the validity of the conclusions made upon statistical analyses could therefore be debatable. In spite of this, aviation research does appear to be on par on most levels with current research in other subject areas. As these other fields call for higher standards for the reporting of research findings, aviation research must keep pace by doing the same. Moreover such improvements in research design and data analysis will provide for more complete, easier to understand, replicable, and meaningful research.

**Recommendations**

The findings of this research call for suggestions for consideration and for future investigation. These include:

1. An expanded study should be conducted on a wider range of aviation publications that includes subject areas such as psychology and human factors journals that likely would have large amounts of statistical analysis.

2. Editors and reviewers of aviation research journals should begin the discussion of raising data reporting standards to include appropriate sample size calculation, power analysis, the inclusion of effect sizes, and additional standards recommended by the APA Task Force on Statistical Inference.

3. Editors and reviewers of aviation research journals may want to begin to accept research methods and best practices articles. These could help disseminate research-based guidance on how to conduct power analyses, calculate effect sizes, use and interpretation of confidence intervals, and how to appropriately cite statistical findings. Such “how-to” articles are common in many other fields of study and are certainly scholarly in nature as they are entirely rooted in the available research literature.

4. Aviation researchers should include evidence based reasoning for the selection of sample size, appropriate consideration of power, and the considered effect size. Further, researchers should insure that they report their statistical findings in a recognized, standard format (e.g. APA). If a study is underpowered, this should be clearly explained as a limitation and efforts to mitigate the effects of this on the study should be discussed.

5. Considering the small sample sizes that are common in some aviation studies, there should be a call for collaboration among aviation programs to further enhance the body of research by boosting available sample sizes. These enhanced samples may provide more compelling results and perhaps make findings more generalizable.

6. Research sponsors such as the FAA and NASA should require the reporting of power and effect size for funded research projects.

7. Editors should supply a checklist of requirements to submitters that would include standards for statistical reporting, e.g. the inclusion of power and effect size as well as reporting all data in a standardized (APA) format.
Further research should be conducted into the quality of statistical reporting in aviation research.

**References**


Abstract

Caffeine is known for its performance enhancing properties. The majority of research focuses on the immediacy effect of caffeine on performance. In contrast, there appears to be limited understanding of the effect of caffeine on the rate at which individuals acquire or learn information. As a result, the present study sought to investigate whether caffeine can facilitate the rate at which individuals acquire and apply skills. Forty-five participants (all pilots) were randomly divided into three groups (0mg/kg, 3mg/kg & 5mg/kg of caffeine) and were asked to complete twelve sessions on a complex computer-based game titled Space Fortress. Following two familiarization trials, administration of caffeine, and a 30-minute distracter task, all participants completed ten consecutive sessions on Space Fortress. Data relating to individual performance on the ten sessions were analyzed in four separate areas – Total Score, Control, Speed, and Accuracy. The results revealed a trend where the 3mg/kg group outperformed both the 0mg/kg and the 5mg/kg groups. The results also suggest that caffeine in dosages equivalent to 5mg/kg have the potential to hinder effective learning. These findings are discussed from a theoretical and operational perspective.
performance enhancing properties. Consider an adult learning environment such as tertiary education or work related training/education course. It is not uncommon for caffeine in the form of tea, coffee or an energy drink to be consumed during such events. The use of caffeine in these circumstances forms the basis of this research. Specifically, the main aim of the present research is to examine the effect of caffeine on learning.

While the relative immediacy of caffeine on human performance appears reasonably understood (Kaplan, Greenwood, Winocur, & Wolever, 2000; Erikson et al., 1985; McLellan, Bell, & Kamimori, 2004; Smith, Kendrick, Maben, & Salmon, 1994; Busch, Taylor, Kanarek, & Holcomb, 2002; Tucha et al., 2006; Molesworth & Young, 2008), there appears to be limited understanding of the effect of caffeine on the rate at which individuals acquire or learn information. According to White, (1988) cognitive enhancement occurs as a result of improving the components involved in mental activities or brain functions, which in turn contribute to controlling observable behavior. Such components include, although not limited to the processes involved in perception, attention, memory (storage and retrieval), cognitive mapping and high-level motor integration. Memory appears to play a leading role in this process (Jarvis, 1993; Gold, 2006). Facilitating memory permits the integration of previous with present material, hence improving performance.

A review of the research literature in the area of caffeine and learning suggests no shortage of studies. When consumed in moderate to high dosages (between 4 and 7 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg)) the effects of caffeine frequently reveal a dose-dependent relationship (Kaplan et al., 2000; Erikson et al., 1985). In contrast, the effect of caffeine in low dosages is less clear (Smit & Roger, 2000; Gillingham, Keef, Keillor, & Tikusis, 2003; Tucha et al., 2006). However, the vast majority of these studies employ single-test designs, thereby focusing on the immediate effect of caffeine on information retention or learning, opposed to how it facilitates in information acquisition (Cestari & Castellano, 1996; Si, Zhang, & Maleszka, 2005; Caska & Molesworth, 2007).

In contrast to the single-test design studies, there appears to be limited research that examines the effect of caffeine over multiple trials, hence rate of learning. The two most cited studies employ cross-sectional surveys focusing on the long-term relationship between self-reported caffeine use and human performance (Jarvis, 1993; Boxtel, Schmitt, Bosma, & Jolles, 2003). While the results of both studies conclude that habitual caffeine intake improves reaction time, their findings disagree in terms of cognitive enhancement. Specifically, while Jarvis (1993) found after controlling for confounding variables such as age, sex, class, and education level, a person who drank six or more cups of coffee or tea a day scored between 4 and 5% higher on an incidental verbal memory and a visuo-spatial reasoning task in comparison to a person who abstained from drinking tea or coffee, Boxtel et al. (2003) found no such effect. Therefore, the main aim of the present research was to examine the effects of caffeine on the rate of learning, over a period more reflective of the operational environment in aviating.

Since the majority of research examining the effects of caffeine on human performance concludes in favor of higher dosages in a dose-dependent manner (Kaplan et al., 2000; Erikson et al., 1985), the present study sought to investigate both a low (3mg/kg) and moderate (5mg/kg) dosage of caffeine. The significance of the lower dosage of caffeine is evident in the applied environment. Specifically, pilots and other professionals alike consume caffeine in the form of coffee or tea in dosages equivalent to three milligrams per kilogram of body weight. This roughly equates into one large strong cup of coffee, or two average-sized cups, opposed to a five milligram per kilogram dose (see Caska & Molesworth, 2007). Finally, pilots were selected for the research namely because: they self-report high levels of caffeine consumption directly prior to crucial phases of flight, such as landing (Petrie & Dawson, 1997; Taneja, 2007), and the hierarchical structure on most flight decks reflects that of a trainer-trainee
relationship (Captain/Co-pilot) where co-pilots often polish their skills under the watchful eye of the Captain. Therefore, this study sought to determine whether caffeine might have a beneficial effect in facilitating the rate of information acquisition or development of skills. Specifically, it was hypothesized that caffeine would have a dose-dependent effect on the rate at which participants/pilots learned.

**Method**

**Participants**

Forty-five participants were recruited from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) Aviation flight training school located at Bankstown airport. All participants were required to hold a current Class 1 Aviation Medical Certificate, indicating they were medically fit for flying. While failure to hold a Class 1 Aviation Medical Certificate served as an exclusion criterion by default, five others were employed. They included: female pilots who indicated that they were pregnant or breast feeding; pilots in general who indicated that they had previously experienced an adverse reaction to caffeine; pilots who indicated they had consumed caffeine within six hours prior to the research; or pilots who had consumed food within one hour prior to the research (no pilots excluded). The participants were randomly divided into three groups (0mg/kg, 3mg/kg & 5mg/kg). The mean age was 20.60 (SD = 2.18) years, the mean total flight experience was 132.04 (SD = 77.76) hours and the mean total hours in the past 90 days was 13.70 (SD = 23.44). The study protocol was approved in advance by UNSW’s Human Research Ethics Committee, and student participation in the research was entirely voluntary (i.e., no research participation payments or course credits awarded).

**Apparatus and Stimulus**

The material comprised: information and consent forms, demographics questionnaire, Epworth Sleepiness Scale, Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking scale, Hunter Risk Perception scale 1 and 2, pharmaceutical grade caffeine, distilled water, and fresh lemons. Additional material included: one personal computer with an optical two-button mouse, one Saitek Cyborg ST90 joystick, Sartorius Analytic scales (to weigh caffeine), digital personal scales (to weigh participants), and Space Fortress.

Space Fortress is a computer-based game that was designed as a research tool at the University of Illinois - Cognitive Psychophysiology Laboratory for the study of complex skills and its acquisition (Mane & Donchin, 1989). The objective of the game is to destroy the space fortress located in the centre of the screen. This is achieved by firing missiles from a space ship under the control (speed and direction) of the operator. The process of destroying the fortress involves first making it vulnerable, followed by a burst of rapid fire. In order to make the fortress vulnerable, the operator needs to hit the fortress ten times with at least 250 msec between each hit. Once this is achieved, it can then be destroyed by two quick shots within an interval of less than 250 msec.

The fortress is however not defenseless. The fortress defends itself by returning fire. It also possesses a second line of defense which involves the use of mines. The mines can either be ‘friendly’ or ‘foe’. The operator is able to distinguish between the type of mine based on a letter which accompanies the mine when presented. Prior to each game a series of letters are presented to the operator which are used to identify the status of the mine. Friendly mines should not be destroyed as they ‘energize’ the ship. In contrast, foe mines should be destroyed. In order to do this, the operator needs to switch between weapon systems by pressing a button twice within an interval of between 250 and 400 msec and then ensuring they score a direct hit.

Points are awarded when the operator hits a hostile element or deducted when their ship is damaged, destroyed, or when a missile fails to hit a target. At the commencement of the game players are provided 100 missiles. Throughout the game, numerous opportunities are presented for the player to obtain more missiles. These predominately occur as a result of the player completing a secondary task such as pressing certain buttons when
a specific symbol is presented (i.e., dollar sign). Therefore, a player can obtain a positive score reflecting some level of mastery in the area of perceptual, cognitive, and motor skills, to a negative score indicating deficiencies in these areas (Mane, & Donchin, 1989).

According to designers of Space Fortress, there are 50 parameters which shape and form the game (Mane, & Donchin, 1989). As a result, performance can be measured at various levels. The most obvious is overall proficiency which is reflected in ‘Total Score’. At a sub-level, researchers are able to determine the speed at which participants identify and destroy mines that appear on the screen (Speed). This is said to be an indirect measure of participants’ memory and reaction time. Researchers are also able to determine participants’ psychomotor skills through the accuracy of their shots, in terms of hitting hostile elements (Accuracy). Researchers are also able to determine participants’ hand-eye coordination and dexterity through how well they maintained control over the ship (Control) (Mane, & Donchin, 1989; Shebilske et al., 2005).

Design

The experiment comprised a single blind between subjects mixed methods experimental design. The aim of the experiment was to examine the effect of caffeine on pilot learning. The study comprised one independent variable with three levels (0mg/kg, 3mg/kg and 5mg/kg of caffeine). The Dependant Variables (DV) included participants’ Total Score (main DV), Control, Speed, and Accuracy during 10 consecutive games on Space Fortress.

Procedure

Participants were informed about the study during academic classes at UNSW Kensington campus and during flight theory classes at Bankstown aerodrome. This included information about the exclusion criteria as well as limited but necessary details about the research. Moreover, since the research concerned the use of a drug, albeit legal, all participants were informed about the potential risks associated with the administration of this drug (i.e., irregular heart beats (arrhythmia), increase blood pressure, respiratory problems, renal and nervous system problems; Daly, 1993). While this process is not unique to this research (see Kamimori, Johnson, Thorne, & Belenky, 2005; Smit & Rogers, 2000; Lyvers et al., 2004) it is important to acknowledge the potential ‘placebo effect’ which may have resulted.

Since caffeine withdrawal has been identified as a factor that impacts on the results of caffeine studies (Yeomans, Ripley, Davies, Rusted, & Rodgers, 2002), participants were also asked to abstain from consuming caffeine products for a period of six hours prior to the research. The benefit of this timeframe was threefold. Specifically, since the half-life of caffeine is between three and seven hours, there should be negligible, if any, residual effects. For habitual caffeine users, the positive stimulant effect of caffeine is reversed soon after the drug is ceased (D’Anci & Kanarek, 2006). Finally, withdrawal symptoms associated with the discontinued use of caffeine begin 12 to 24 hours post last administration (Dews, O’Broem, & Bergman, 2002).

For all pilots who agreed to volunteer for the study, a mutually suitable time between the hours of 0900 and 1100 was arranged with the researcher to partake in the study. This is also important as it ensured that the effects of circadian rhythms did not adversely impact on the study (Kirkcaldy, 1984).

On the day of the research, participants were initially weighed and then asked to complete pre-experiment demographics and consent forms. Based on the self-reported information in these forms, no participants were excluded from the study as all indicated that they abstained from caffeine consumption for a period of six hours prior to the experiment and food consumption one hour prior, as requested.

Participants were then provided two practice games on Space Fortress. The first practice game was accompanied by instructions, while the second practice game provided the participants an opportunity to become familiar with the game. Following the practice games, and depending on which
group participants were randomly assigned, they were asked to consume a lemon based solution containing either, zero, three, or five milligrams of caffeine per kilogram of body weight. The lemon, which was freshly squeezed, served to mask the bitter taste of the caffeine. Since the caffeine was pharmaceutical grade in the form of white soluble powder, no smell was present.

Following consumption of the lemon based solution, participants were provided a distracter task that took approximately 30 minutes and involved completing Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking scale and Hunter’s Risk Perception scale 1 and 2. The purpose of the distracter task was to allow sufficient time for the caffeine administered to be absorbed (Arnaud, 1993; D’Anci & Kanarek, 2006) and reflected a time consistent with caffeine consumption on the flight deck prior to landing. After the distracter task, participants were asked to complete 10 consecutive games on Space Fortress. Each game took approximately three minutes to complete. Hence, the testing phase of the experiment lasted for approximately 30 minutes, well within the half-life estimates (e.g. three to seven hours) of caffeine (D’Anci & Kanarek, 2006). At the conclusion of the ten games, participants were offered a glass of water to counter the possible dehydration effect of caffeine, debriefed, and thanked for their participation.

Results

Analyses

The main aim of the study was to examine the effect of caffeine on pilot learning ability. This involved measuring and comparing pilots’ performance in terms of Total Score, in addition to three sub categories: Control, Speed, and Accuracy over 10 consecutive games. Prior to analyzing the results of each game across the four dependent variables, it was important to first establish that the results being examined were not influenced by any external factors such as the effects of sleepiness or prior gaming experience. Therefore, a series of univariate analyses of variance were conducted in these areas.

Pre-Screening

The effects of sleepiness. Since the effect of daytime sleepiness has previously been identified as a factor which influences performance, a univariate analysis of variance was employed to determine whether differences existed between groups as self reported using the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS). The results failed to reveal a difference between group (0mg/kg, 3mg/kg & 5mg/kg), in terms of self reported sleepiness $F(2, 42) = 1.68, p = 1.99, \eta^2 = .074$. These results suggest that all participants experienced the same level of arousal.

The effects of prior gaming experience. Similar to examining the effects of daytime sleepiness across groups, it was also important to examine whether groups varied as a result of prior gaming experience. Since computer-based video games largely fall into two categories, namely video game with consoles and video games with joysticks, two separate univariate analyses were performed. With alpha set a .05, the results of two univariate analysis of variances failed to reveal any statistically significant differences between group and gaming experience, largest $F(2, 42) = .43, p = .65, \eta^2 = .020$. As a result, it can be concluded that the three groups were not significantly different in terms of their computer-based gaming experience.

Main Data Analyze

Rate of learning. The main aim of the current experiment was to examine the effect of caffeine on the rate at which individuals (pilots) acquire and apply knowledge and skills - rate of learning. Rate of learning is expected to be a function of performance. Thus in the present study, any increase in performance is reflected in an increase in score. Remember, a player can obtain a positive score reflecting some level of mastery in the area of perceptual, cognitive, and motor skills. Similarly a player can obtain a negative score indicating deficiencies in these areas. In order to
examine if this was the case, multiple time series analyses were employed.

As seen in Figure 1, data relating to participants’ performance over the ten test games appear to fall into two categories, based on the number of tests completed. Specifically, participants’ performance across all groups, up to and including test 6, appear curvilinear, whereas participants’ performance post-test 6 appear linear, reflecting the x-axis (i.e., plateau). Figures 2 – 4 (scatter plots) illustrate the dispersion of scores in each group during this period of heightened learning (i.e., tests 1 - 6). An inspection of the Slope of the Linear Regression Line (SLRL) for the first 6 tests revealed the 3mg/kg groups’ (270.90 – SLRL) rate of learning was higher than the 0mg/kg groups’ (205.70 – SLRL), as well as the 5mg/kg groups’ (125.22 – SLRL). This result suggests that caffeine in 3mg/kg dosages facilitates in the rate of learning opposed to abstaining from caffeine, whereas 5mg/kg appears to degrade performance (i.e., learning) compared to caffeine abstinence or 3mg/kg.

Once performance plateaus, as seen post-test 6, the SLRL is more subdued. Specifically, the SLRL for the 3mg/kg group was 46.67, for the 0mg/kg group 25.95, and 34.60 for the 5mg/kg group. Extrapolating this data (tests 7 - 10), the results suggest that any improvement in performance evident up to this point is maintained across group.

In order to determine if caffeine had a greater impact on one aspect of learning opposed to another, participants’ performance was examined on the three key sub-levels of Total Score for tests 1 to 6. Consistent with the previous analyses, SLRL

Figure 1. Total score for each treatment group over the ten tests.

1 The results of an ANOVA failed to reveal a statistical difference between the three groups during the first test F(2, 42) = 1.01, p = .38, η² = .046, suggesting all groups performed equally.
Figure 2. Test scores from the 0mg/kg group, including line of best fit over test sessions 1 - 6.

Figure 3. Test scores from the 3mg/kg group, including line of best fit over test sessions 1 - 6.

Figure 4. Test scores from the 5mg/kg group, including line of best fit over test sessions 1 - 6.
was reviewed across group for Control, Speed, and Accuracy. Table 1 displays the SLRL and the percent it represents of the total for each group (0mg/kg, 3mg/kg, & 5mg/kg caffeine) across the three sub-levels (Control, Speed and Accuracy) of Total Score. As evident from this table, the 5mg/kg consistently performed below the 0mg/kg and 3mg/kg groups. In contrast, the 0mg/kg out performed the 3mg/kg group on the Accuracy sub-level, while the reverse was true for the two other sub-levels. Overall, this data reflects a trend which suggests caffeine in dosages equivalent to 5mg/kg degrades performance in terms of skill acquisition in the area of hand-eye coordination control (control), memory and reaction time (speed), and psychomotor skills (accuracy), while the reverse is true for caffeine in dosages equivalent to 3mg/kg.

### Discussion

The main aim of the present study was to examine the effects of caffeine on pilot learning. Specifically, how caffeine influences the rate at which pilots acquire and apply information/knowledge. Pilots were asked to complete ten consecutive games on Space Fortress, thirty minutes post treatment (0mg/kg, 3mg/kg, or 5mg/kg of caffeine in a lemon based solution). Participants’ performance throughout the games were measured and compared between groups in four areas. Specifically, data relating to participants’ Total Score and three sub-levels - Control, Speed, and Accuracy were compared and analyzed. It was hypothesized that caffeine would have a dose-dependent effect on the rate at which participants/pilots learned. The results overall failed to support the hypothesis. An inspection of the results revealed a relationship between caffeine and rate of learning. Specifically, pilots who consumed 3mg/kg of caffeine appeared to acquire and apply knowledge and skills faster than those participants who abstained from caffeine or those participants who consumed 5mg/kg of caffeine. The most notable difference was observed with those participants who consumed the highest dosage of caffeine - 5mg/kg. Specifically, participants who consumed 5mg/kg experienced what could only be described as learning detriment when compared to participants who abstained from caffeine.

Once the rate of learning appeared to plateau, this trend appeared to remain. Moreover, the 3mg/kg group, having appeared to learn faster and to a higher level, was able to sustain this advantage over the two other groups; the most notable being the 5mg/kg group. Similarly, the 0mg/kg group mirrored this result in comparison to the 5mg/kg group. The implication of these finding are far reaching. Consider the example proposed earlier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Level of Total Score</th>
<th>Control (%)</th>
<th>Speed (%)</th>
<th>Accuracy (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0mg/kg</td>
<td>82.78 (34)</td>
<td>24.15 (36)</td>
<td>2.63 (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3mg/kg</td>
<td>105.94 (44)</td>
<td>37.35 (56)</td>
<td>2.13 (39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5mg/kg</td>
<td>53.93 (22)</td>
<td>5.43 (8)</td>
<td>.65 (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.

*Slope of linear regression line and percent it represents of the total for each treatment group distributed across the three sub-level variables for test sessions 1 - 6.*
involving attending a conference, university lecture or training event and consuming caffeine in the form of tea or coffee. While there are a number of reasons for drinking caffeine, such as social or habit, the effect caffeine has on individuals’ ability to acquire information from such an event remains largely untested. Based on the results of the present study, it would appear drinking approximately one large cup of coffee (approximate caffeine equivalent to 3mg/kg) has a positive impact on both the rate at which individuals acquire information as well as their ability to maintain this superior performance when compared to caffeine abstinence or drinking in excess of 3mg/kg. If fact, the results suggest drinking in excess of 3mg/kg can only be described as detrimental to performance.

Performance decrements from caffeine consumption are not new. The medical profession, and specifically surgeons, have long known about the negative effects of caffeine on fine motor skills (see Urso-baiarda, Shurey, & Grobbelaar, 2007). However, the implication of this within the aviation industry appears largely unexplored. With the introduction of electronic interface flight controls, otherwise known as fly-by-wire (centre or side) controls (similar to a traditional computer joystick, except with the support of more sophisticated hardware and software), in a number of modern jet aircraft such as the Airbus A340 and A380 as well as some military jets, a reduction in pilots’ psychomotor skills may translate into an inability to complete fine or minor adjustments of the flight control. That said, there is little evidence to suggest that pilots consume caffeine in quantities equivalent to the 5mg/kg tested in the present research.

Limitations and Future Research

The results of the present study should be interpreted with the presence of certain limitations. From an operational perspective, the most notable being the generalizability of the results. As discussed above, this is as a direct result of the strict experimental parameters applied to the research. While such conditions facilitate in the objective measure of the dependent variable, they do not reflect those typically experienced in the operational environment. From a methodological perspective, and while there is no evidence to suggest that employing a single-blind experiment design negatively impacted the results, it would be prudent to ensure that all future experiments consider employing a double-blind experimental design to reduce the potential of any researcher bias.

Future research should also attempt to obtain an object measure of caffeine levels (i.e., caffeine plasma levels) prior to experimentation to confirm self-reported caffeine abstinence. In addition, future research should attempt to tease out the effects of long-term (habitual) caffeine use on performance in terms of rate of learning. While the mean age of participants in the present study was 20 years, far less than that examined by Jarvis, (1993) and Boxtel et al., (2003) the effects of continual caffeine consumption at this age on rate of learning remains unknown and is indeed an area for future research.

Not negating the above limitations, it would be prudent to investigate the longevity of the effect seen in the present research. Moreover, future research should investigate whether the superior performance illustrated by 3mg/kg group is sustained over the long term or whether this performance is eroded once the stimulant effects of caffeine wear-off. Future research should also be directed towards investigating the underlying cognitive mechanisms resulting in the performance variations. Specifically, while memory has been identified as a key component in cognition (Jarvis, 1993; Gold, 2006), the extent to which performance improvements in terms of rate of learning can attributed to memory alone remains unknown. Similarly, how caffeine impacts perception, attention, and decision-making in this area also requires further investigation.

Conclusion

In summary, caffeine is regularly used on the flight deck to enhance performance (Petrie & Dawson, 1997; Taneja, 2007). From a trainee’s perspective (i.e., co-pilot) the beneficial effects of caffeine potentially extend beyond the immediate and facil-
itates performance over the long-term, most likely through enhancements in memory. However, empirically there appears to be no known study to support this conclusion. As a result the present study sought to examine the effects of caffeine in facilitating the rate of learning. The results of the present study suggest that caffeine in low dosages equivalent to 3mg/kg facilitates not only the rate of learning but maintaining this higher level of performance, albeit over a short period of time as seen in the present research. Importantly, when compared to abstaining from caffeine or drinking one large cup of coffee/tea (equivalent to 3mg/kg), dosages in excess of this result in performance determents. Additional research is required to investigate this finding further, as the significance of dexterity within aviation becomes increasingly important with the increasing number of commercial aircraft employing fly-by-wire stick (joystick) controls.

REFERENCES


Performance is associated with glucose regulation in healthy elderly persons and can be enhanced with glucose and dietary carbohydrates. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 72, 825-36.


